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I. INTRODUCTION
For the past seven years, bankruptcy experts have watched 
from the sidelines as Congress has considered an omnibus 
bankruptcy bill.1 Proponents of the bill have been dismissive of 
1. See Richard L. Stehl, The Failings of the Credit Counseling and Debtor Education
Requirements of the Proposed Consumer Bankruptcy Reform Legislation of 1998, 7 AM. BANKR. 
INST. L. REV. 133, 143–44 (1999); Charles Jordan Tabb, A Century of Regress or Progress? A 
Political History of Bankruptcy Legislation in 1898 and 1998, 15 BANKR. DEV. J. 343, 348–50 
(1999); Elizabeth Warren, The Changing Politics of American Bankruptcy Reform, 37 
OSGOODE HALL L.J. 189, 201 (1999) (“By politicizing the debates, the special interest groups 
took some of the most important professionals out of the debates.”). For example, groups such 
as the National Bankruptcy Conference and the Commercial Law League produced detailed 
section-by-section analyses of the legislation and marked up each version of the legislation with 
technical corrections, often at the request of Congressional staffers. See Tabb, supra, at 349 
(noting the numerous pleas by the National Bankruptcy Conference and other bankruptcy 
groups). Bankruptcy judges, lawyers, trustees, and academics testified at hearings and offered 
additional assistance to lawmakers and staffers. See, e.g., The Consumer Bankruptcy Reform 
Act: Seeking Fair and Practical Solutions to the Consumer Bankruptcy Crisis: Hearing on S. 
1301 Before S. Judiciary Subcomm. on Admin. Oversight and the Courts, 105th Cong. (Mar. 
11, 1998) [hereinafter Hearing on S. 1301], 1998 WL 8993073 (witness list); Hearing on S. 
1301, supra, 1998 WL 8993336 (opening statement of Chuck Grassley, Chairman, S. Judiciary 
Subcomm. on Admin. Oversight and the Courts). Yet Congress did not seriously engage with 
these parties. See, e.g., Elizabeth Warren, The Market for Data: The Changing Role of Social 
Sciences in Shaping the Law, 2002 WIS. L. REV. 1, 32–33 (discussing repeated and unreturned 
calls that Professor Warren made to Rep. Gekas’s staff to discuss statistics featured in Gekas’s 
press release). See generally DAVID A. SKEEL, JR., DEBT’S DOMINION: A HISTORY OF 
BANKRUPTCY LAW IN AMERICA (2001) (discussing interest group history of bankruptcy); Susan 
Block-Lieb, Congress’ Temptation to Defect: A Political and Economic Theory of Legislative 
Resolutions to Financial Common Pool Problems, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 801 (1997) (contrasting 
disorganized representation of debtor’s interests with organized and narrowly focused groups 
within the credit industry); cf. generally Bruce G. Carruthers & Terence C. Halliday, 
Professionals in Systemic Reform of Bankruptcy Law: The 1978 U.S. Bankruptcy Code and the 
English Insolvency Act 1986, 74 AM. BANKR. L.J. 35 (2000) (discussing the role of bankruptcy 
experts in the 1978 Bankruptcy Code revision). 
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bankruptcy “establishment”2 concerns and input.3 The 
bankruptcy establishment generally has thought that the bill is 
misguided and poorly drafted, but lawmakers have 
overwhelmingly supported it, largely on a bipartisan basis.4 Year 
after year, Congress after Congress, lawmakers have lined up in 
favor of the bill in large numbers. Yet proponents have had 
surprising difficulty actually getting this bill enacted. 
Although the determinants of legislative development are 
complex and controversial, this Article focuses on the role of the 
news media. Notwithstanding Congress’s general dismissal of the 
bankruptcy establishment’s criticisms and concerns,5 the “fourth 
branch”6 may have helped the excluded opposition by reframing 
the debates in ways that had the potential to produce controversy 
and delay.7 Once a story of debtor irresponsibility and a 
2. Proponents of the bankruptcy bill sometimes used this term to refer to most
bankruptcy lawyers (including those who represent various types of creditors), trustees, judges, 
and academics who expressed opposition to the legislation. 
3. See, e.g., Rep. Bill McCollum, Bankruptcy Reform: A Return to Responsibility, HILL 
(May 20, 1998) (describing a “campaign of false information being disseminated by bankruptcy 
attorneys, bankruptcy ‘experts’ and other people maligning the legislation to further their 
agendas,” but finding that “after subjecting the multitude of half-truths and false statements 
disseminated by the critics . . . to the light of day, they just don’t stand up”); Tom Hamburger, 
Auto Firms See Profit in Bankruptcy-Reform Bill Provision, WALL ST. J., Mar. 13, 2001, at A28 
[hereinafter Hamburger, Auto Firms See Profit in Bankruptcy-Reform] (“The bankruptcy 
establishment likes the system the way they have been running it.” (quoting an industry 
analyst)); Jacob M. Schlesinger, Card Games: As Bankruptcies Surge, Creditors Lobby Hard to 
Get Tougher Laws, WALL ST. J., June 17, 1998, at A1 [hereinafter Schlesinger, As Bankruptcies 
Surge] (stating that the bankruptcy establishment simply prefers the status quo); refer also to 
note 5 infra. 
4. See, e.g., Congress Returns to an Active Legislative Agenda, WASH. WKLY., Feb. 26,
1999, http://www.bondmarkets.com/w-weekly/1999/wk022699.shtml (stating that Gekas’s bill 
has wide bipartisan support in the House); Kathleen Day, House Passes Bankruptcy Limits: 
Measure Would Make It Harder for Consumers to Wipe Out All Debts, WASH. POST, Mar. 2, 
2001, at A1 [hereinafter Day, House Passes Bankruptcy Limits] (“There’s broad, bipartisan 
support for updating the nation’s bankruptcy system and making it more balanced.” (quoting 
Sen. Grassley)); Rep. George W. Gekas, Protecting Poor Debtors, N.Y. TIMES, May 17, 1999, at 
A20 (observing the large amount of Democratic House support for the bill); Michael Schroeder 
& Jacob M. Schlesinger, Financial-Services Bills Appear Dead, For Now, WALL ST. J., Oct. 12, 
1998, at A4 (quoting American Bankers Association lobbyist as stating that given “clear 
bipartisan majorities for both bills, we believe we can start early next year and have them 
enacted fairly quickly”); Katharine Q. Seelye, First Lady in a Messy Fight on the Eve of Her 
Campaign, N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 1999, § 1, at 1 [hereinafter Seelye, First Lady in a Messy 
Fight] (quoting a MasterCard representative as stating that “it’s fair to say there is strong 
bipartisan support for bankruptcy reform”). 
5. Tabb, supra note 1, at 348–50 (chronicling Rep. Gekas’s statement that “he and
others in Congress would do what they pleased about bankruptcy, and did not really care what 
the bankruptcy community thought about the matter”). 
6. See DOUGLASS CATER, THE FOURTH BRANCH OF GOVERNMENT 13 (1959) (referring to
the news media). 
7. Cf. Gary Blasi, Advocacy and Attribution: Shaping and Responding to Perceptions of
the Causes of Homelessness, 19 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 207, 209 (2000) (discussing the 
timing and approach of homeless advocates’ public relations strategy); Dorothy A. Brown, The 
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permissive system,8 bankruptcy became framed by issues of 
credit industry power, predation, and influence, loopholes for the 
rich, and, perhaps most effectively, concerns for women and 
children.9 
This Article describes the path of this omnibus bankruptcy 
legislation, offers an interdisciplinary analysis of the role of news 
media in policymaking, and discusses these three emerging 
frames. It then presents a structure for evaluating the impact of 
the frames: controversy, bill improvement, and public 
Invisibility Factor: The Limits of Public Choice Theory and Public Institutions, 74 WASH. U. 
L.Q. 179, 215 (1996) (showing how media can influence legislative processes in ways that 
public choice theory does not predict or explain); Vincent Schiraldi & Dan Macallair, Framing 
the Framers: Changing the Debate over Juvenile Crime in San Francisco, in DO THE MEDIA 
GOVERN? POLITICIANS, VOTERS, AND REPORTERS IN AMERICA 409, 411–12 (Shanto Iyengar & 
Richard Reeves eds., 1997) [hereinafter DO THE MEDIA GOVERN?] (observing advocates’ 
attempt to use the media to frame juvenile justice); Daniel Shaviro, Beyond Public Choice and 
Public Interest: A Study of the Legislative Process as Illustrated by Tax Legislation in the 1980s, 
139 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 98 (1990) (stating that the media is a potentially powerful ally of, and has 
a symbiotic relationship with, policy entrepreneurs); see also KATHLEEN HALL JAMIESON & 
PAUL WALDMAN, THE PRESS EFFECT: POLITICIANS, JOURNALISTS, AND THE STORIES THAT SHAPE 
THE WORLD 185 (2003) (analyzing strategic narratives used in political campaigns); Joshua A. 
Newberg, The Narrative Construction of Antitrust, 12 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 181, 185–92 
(2003) (analyzing competing narratives in Microsoft antitrust case); Joshua Wolf Shenk, Get 
Me Rewrite! Stories Make the World Go Around. So How Come Liberals Can’t Tell One?, 
Mother Jones, at http://www.motherjones.com/commentary/columns/2004/05/05_200.html 
(May 14, 2004) (noting the lack of compelling narrative in the John Kerry campaign). 
8. For lawmakers’ views along these lines, see, e.g., Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1998:
Hearing on H.R. 3150 Before the Subcomm. on Commercial and Administrative Law of the 
House Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 8 (1998) (statement of Rep. McCollum). 
[P]eople see bankruptcy as a financial planning tool, spurred on by 
advertisements . . . . [T]he social stigma associated with filing for bankruptcy has 
eroded. Bankruptcy was never meant to be used as a financial planning tool or for 
mere convenience. These “bankruptcies of convenience” are a clear misuse of the 
bankruptcy system, as bankruptcy becomes a first stop rather than a last resort. 
Id.; Hearing on Bankruptcy Reform and Financial Services Issues Before the Senate Comm. on 
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 106th Cong. (1999) (prepared testimony of Rep. 
Boucher) (“Bankruptcies of convenience are driving this increase.”), http://banking.senate.gov/ 
99_03hrg/032599/boucher.htm; 145 CONG. REC. H2646 (daily ed. May 5, 1999) (statement of 
Rep. Pryce) (“[W]hen intelligent citizens ignore basic common sense by spending outside of 
their means, we need to establish a reasonable level of accountability and demand some 
personal responsibility to protect those who have extended credit to them in good faith.”); 
Robin Jeweler, Congressional Res. Serv., Issues in Consumer Bankruptcy Reform Before the 
107th Congress 2–3 (Feb. 9, 2001). 
The high volume of consumer bankruptcy filings during the 1990’s fuels the 
argument that the current law is too lenient, i.e., “debtor-friendly.” . . . The legislation 
is intended, among other things, to make filing more difficult and thereby thwart 
“bankruptcies of convenience”; to revive the social “stigma” of a bankruptcy filing; to 
prevent bankruptcy from being utilized as a financial planning tool; to determine 
who can pay their indebtedness and to ensure that they do. 
Id. For news coverage to this effect, refer to notes 20–23 infra and accompanying text. 
9. Refer to Part IV infra; see also JAMIESON & WALDMAN, supra note 7, at 122 (stating
that the framing of issues is “the product of a give-and-take between political actors and 
reporters”). 
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educational value.10 In a brief analysis of each of these issues, I 
posit that two frames increased the bill’s controversy, two were 
likely related to changes made to the bill (although it is disputed 
whether those changes constitute improvements), and the frame 
of women and children had the greatest educational value, 
notwithstanding assertions by some lawmakers and 
commentators that this frame was contrived.11  
Demonstrating a precise causal relationship between the 
media and the legislative process goes well beyond the far more 
modest aims of this Article and would have required a different 
type of analysis and methodology. Nonetheless, this initial 
exploration suggests that had the news media continued to frame 
bankruptcy principally in terms of debtor irresponsibility and 
system permissiveness, the legislative process may have unfolded 
differently. The implications far transcend the subject of 
bankruptcy. 
II. LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENT AND THE PROMINENT
BANKRUPTCY STORY 
In the mid-1990s, Congress had no obvious interest in 
making major bankruptcy changes. It passed a set of modest 
amendments in 1994.12 It also established a National Bankruptcy 
Review Commission to study the bankruptcy system for a two-
10. For discussions of media being the principal source of the public’s knowledge about
law, see, e.g., Linda Greenhouse, Telling the Court’s Story: Justice and Journalism at the 
Supreme Court, 105 YALE L.J. 1537, 1538 (1996) (noting that the public’s only knowledge of the 
workings of the Supreme Court derives from occasional references in the media); Cass R. 
Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021, 2050 (1996) (noting that 
the public learns about court cases through the news media, if at all); Catherine E. Vance & 
Paige Barr, The Facts & Fiction of Bankruptcy Reform, 1 DEPAUL BUS. & COMM. L.J. 361, 364 
n.12 (2003) (“[E]ven extensive coverage [of bankruptcy reform] in the print media does not 
mean that most Americans fully understand bankruptcy reform and its heavy industry 
support.”); Daniel M. Filler, From Law to Content in the New Media Marketplace, 90 CAL. L. 
REV. 1739, 1754–55 (2002) (reviewing FEDWA MALTI-DOUGLAS, STARR REPORT DISROBED 
(2000)) (observing that the news serves as the principal intermediary for the public to discover 
law). But see JIM WILLIS, THE SHADOW WORLD: LIFE BETWEEN THE NEWS MEDIA AND REALITY 
140–43 (1991) (arguing that the anti-big-business values of reporting interfere with business 
reporters’ ability to educate the public); John J. Oslund, The Media and Government 
Regulation: Guarding the Hen House, 11 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 559, 561 (2002) (arguing that 
the media is a less effective educator on “narrower issues that are more complex and/or 
abstract”). For a focus on how fictional accounts contribute to the public’s understanding of law, 
see, e.g., PRIME TIME LAW: FICTIONAL TELEVISION AS LEGAL NARRATIVE VII (Robert M. Jarvis 
& Paul R. Joseph eds., 1998) (surveying television’s ability to influence people’s understandings 
of the legal world); Martha Merrill Umphrey, Media Melodrama! Sensationalism and the 1907 
Trial of Harry Thaw, 43 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 715, 718 (1999) (noting that criminal trial 
reporting contributes to a popular understanding of criminal responsibility). 
11. Refer to Part IV.C infra.
12. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394, 108 Stat. 4107. 
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year period.13 Congress told the Bankruptcy Commission that it 
did not have a mandate to propose significant changes.14 
Commission members were chosen by the President, Chief 
Justice Rehnquist, and minority and majority leaders in the 
House and Senate.15 Both the bankruptcy establishment and the 
financial services industry were actively involved.16 They 
participated in well-attended meetings and hearings around the 
country17 and wrote thousands of letters and e-mail 
submissions.18 
During this process, however, the annual bankruptcy filing 
rate surpassed one million.19 This large number of bankruptcy 
13. §§ 602, 608, 108 Stat. at 4147, 4149. The Bankruptcy Commission was charged with
investigating and studying issues and problems relating to Title 11, evaluating the advisability 
of proposals and current arrangements, preparing a report, and soliciting divergent views. 
§ 603. 
14. H.R. REP. NO. 103-835, at 59 (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3340, 3368. 
[T]he Commission should be aware that Congress is generally satisfied with the basic 
framework established in the current Bankruptcy Code. Therefore, the work of the
Commission should be based upon reviewing, improving, and updating the Code in
ways which do not disturb the fundamental tenets and balance of current law.
Id. Sen. Grassley, who later would figure prominently in bankruptcy reform, echoed this 
sentiment in floor statements: 
I want to stress that this Commission is designed to review the code, and we are not 
setting it up to overhaul it. The term “fine tuning” might better fit the purpose . . . , 
because we on the Judiciary Committee are generally satisfied with the code, and we 
are not interested in the proposals that start from scratch. 
140 CONG. REC. S4508 (1994) (statement of Sen. Grassley). 
15. The Commission members themselves generally cannot be described as quintessential
bankruptcy establishment. In terms of membership, President Clinton chose labor lawyer 
Babette Ceccotti and CPA and turnaround expert Jay Alix as members, and former Congressman 
Mike Synar as the chair, who was succeeded by lawyer Brady Williamson after Synar passed 
away. Nat’l Bankr. Review Comm’n, Bankruptcy: The Next Twenty Years 15 (Oct. 20, 1997) 
[hereinafter Bankruptcy: The Next Twenty Years], http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/nbrc/report/ 
01title.html. Chief Justice Rehnquist chose Hon. Edith Jones of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Fifth Circuit and Hon. Robert Ginsberg of the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of 
Illinois. Id. at 54, 56. Rep. Robert Michel (R-Ill.) appointed former Congressman M. Caldwell 
Butler, Rep. Thomas Foley (D-Wash.) appointed real estate lawyer John Gose, Senators Robert 
Byrd (D-W. Va.) and George Mitchell (D-Me.) appointed lawyer Jeffery Hartley, and Sen. Bob 
Dole (R-Kan.) appointed tax consultant James Shepard. Id. at 56–57. The reporter was Professor 
Elizabeth Warren, and the two principal consultants were Professor Lawrence P. King and 
lawyer Stephen H. Case. Id. at 57. 
16. See, e.g., Hon. William T. Bodoh & Lawrence P. Dempsey, Bankruptcy Reform: An
Orderly Development of Public Policy?, 49 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 191, 194 (2001) (describing open 
process of Bankruptcy Commission). 
17. Bankruptcy: The Next Twenty Years, supra note 15, at 65 (noting that the Commission 
held twenty-one hearings and meetings at sites throughout the nation, which were attended by 
more than 2600 people). 
18. Id. at 68 (noting that the Commission received over 2300 submissions from the
bankruptcy community and the general public). 
19. See Bankruptcy Filing Statistics, Administrative Office of the United States Courts (on 
file with the Houston Law Review) (including business & nonbusiness bankruptcy cases for the 
period ending September 30, 1996). 
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filings within a single year provoked questions about the 
neediness of bankruptcy filers and the permissiveness of the 
system.20 For example, newspapers quoted Federal Reserve 
Board Chair Alan Greenspan as lamenting that “personal 
bankruptcies are soaring because Americans have lost their 
sense of shame in filing for bankruptcy court protection” and 
noting that “a disappearance of ‘the stigma of bankruptcy.’”21 The 
USA Today editorial desk blamed consumer attitudes, a decline 
in stigma, and bankruptcy laws that were too easy.22 A later 
editorial asked, “Could there really be so much quiet desperation 
amid so much plenty? Or—as seems more likely—is bankruptcy 
protection just too easy to get these days?”23 Examples of similar 
quotes could fill a law review article by themselves, and it was 
within this environment that the Bankruptcy Commission 
completed its work. 
20. See, e.g., Mary Deibel, Bankruptcies Booming in ‘97 Despite Economic Prosperity, 
ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, June 11, 1997, at 10B (recognizing that “people who are feeling good 
about the economy and get in over their heads also are contributing to the increase”); Saul 
Hansell, Personal Bankruptcies Surging as Economy Hums, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 25, 1996, § 1, at 1 
(stating that one reason for the increase in bankruptcy filings is that the stigma attached to filing 
bankruptcy is no longer present); Editorial, “Last Resort Is Coming First”: Something’s Wrong: In 
These Good Times, Bankruptcy Is Booming, L.A. TIMES, July 28, 1997, at B4 (“Something is 
haywire in the way Americans deal with personal debt. How else to explain the record 
bankruptcy filings in California and other states with strong job growth, decreasing 
unemployment and much improved economies?”). Notably, the L.A. Times editorial page later 
became critical of the bankruptcy legislation. See Editorial, Bankruptcy Non-Reform: Proposed 
Changes Would Weaken Protections for Truly Needy Debtors and Leave Unchanged Gaping 
Loopholes that Wealthy Filers Use to Put Up Shield of Bankruptcy, L.A. TIMES, June 8, 1998, at 
B4 (observing that the credit industry claims that consumers are avoiding debt through 
bankruptcy laws). 
21. Bloomberg News, Filings Worry Greenspan, TIMES-PICAYUNE, Mar. 20, 1997, at C6; see 
also James Carter, Bankruptcy as the Last Resort, WASH. TIMES, Dec. 18, 1996, at A15 (“In 
practice, however, [a] fresh start sometimes becomes a free ride.”); L. Stuart Ditzen, Credit Cards 
Paving a Path to Bankruptcy, PHILA. INQUIRER, Aug. 25, 1996, at A1 (describing credit-card use 
as an addiction and a nasty vice, and describing bankruptcy as a “quick way out of excess credit-
card debt”); Hansell, supra note 20 (“‘I’m just taking advantage of one of the opportunities the 
Government offers. It doesn’t have the stigma it had.’” (quoting an individual debtor)). 
22. Editorial, Too-Easy Bankruptcy Laws Give Abusers a Free Ride, USA TODAY, Oct. 4,
1996, at 12A (explaining that overuse of the bankruptcy system costs each American family about 
$100 per year in higher interest costs and prices). However, USA Today also published an 
“opposing view” editorial. See Gary Klein, Editorial, Blame the Credit Pushers, USA TODAY, Oct. 
4, 1996, at 12A (“Responsibility for the increase in filings should be placed where it belongs—on a 
system that pushes people to use more credit than they can afford. The pusher in this system is 
the consumer-credit industry.”). 
23. Editorial, Debtor’s Delight, INVESTOR’S BUS. DAILY, Jan. 15, 1998, at A30. 
Once upon a time, bankruptcy was a shameful state, one indulged in only by
“deadbeats’ and losers.” Unfortunately, just as sharing living quarters with a member of 
the opposite sex, bearing children out of wedlock and suing people for no good reason
have become routine, bankruptcy shows signs of becoming positively fashionable. 
Morally Bankrupt, N.Y. POST, Dec. 21, 1997, at 60. 
1098 HOUSTON LAW REVIEW [41:4
The Bankruptcy Commission’s final report, dated October 
20, 1997, bulged with over 170 recommendations for changes to 
all types of bankruptcy cases.24 Although the majority of the 
Commission expressed concern about the filing rate, it did not 
attribute the filing increase to the reasons that the press and 
cited sources often identified.25 Even before the Commission 
issued its final report, however, the credit industry expressed 
public distaste for its proposals and its failure to propose new 
restrictions on bankruptcy eligibility.26 Consequently, the industry 
turned to friends in Congress.27 
A. 105th Congress (1997–1998)
Rep. Bill McCollum (R-Fla.) did not wait for the Bankruptcy
Commission to submit its report before introducing consumer 
bankruptcy legislation, The Responsible Borrower Protection 
Bankruptcy Act, House Bill 2500, on September 18, 1997.28 
24. See generally Bankruptcy: The Next Twenty Years, supra note 15 (providing chapters of 
recommendations on topics ranging from family payment plans to partnership 
recommendations). 
25. Id. at 82–95 (citing, among other things, an increase in available consumer credit as
contributing to the rise in bankruptcy filings). 
26. See, e.g., Paul Gentile, No Happy Campers Here: National Bankruptcy Review
Commission Issues Final Report, CREDIT UNION TIMES, Oct. 29, 1997, at 1 (“‘What I think they 
should do with the report is forget they ever wrote it.’” (reporting a credit union president’s 
statement)); Donald G. Ogilvie, Executive Vice President, Am. Bankers’ Ass’n, Letters to the 
Editor: Placing the Blame for Bankruptcy Reform, WALL ST. J., Aug. 26, 1997, at A17 
(“[R]ecommendations make it easy for people of means to walk away from their debts while 
raising the cost of goods and services for every U.S. consumer—not the solution we need given 
record consumer bankruptcy filings.”); see also Steve Cocheo, In Debt and Loving It: With Record 
Numbers Filing for Bankruptcy, Something Besides These Debtors Is “Broke.” Question Is, Will 
Upcoming Recommendations of a Federal Commission Fix Anything?, A.B.A. BANKING J., Aug. 
1997, at 30 (noting that the Commission has received criticism from both debtor and creditor 
interests), http://www.banking.com/aba/cover_0897.htm; Jaret Seiberg, Deeply Split Bankruptcy 
Commission May Lack Clout with Lawmakers, AM. BANKER, June 20, 1997, at 1 (quoting a credit 
industry lobbyist describing a Commission proposal as “‘one nail in the credibility of the 
commission’”). Some Commission proposals, however, did coincide with credit industry proposals. 
Compare Bankruptcy: The Next Twenty Years, supra note 15, with Transcript, Presentation of 
National Consumer Bankruptcy Coalition to the National Bankruptcy Review Commission (Dec. 
17, 1996) (including recommendations for multiple filing restrictions, random audits, and better 
data collection). 
27. See SKEEL, JR., supra note 1, at 187–88 (noting that “creditors were less than
enthusiastic” about the Bankruptcy Commission process and promoted legislation to “preempt” 
the Bankruptcy Commission recommendations); Robert J. Landry, III, The Policy and Forces 
Behind Consumer Bankruptcy Reform: A Classic Battle Over Problem Definition, 33 U. MEM. L. 
REV. 509, 517–18 (2003) (suggesting that when credit industry lobbyists failed to induce the 
Commission to produce a report aligned with their interests, the creditors turned to Congress and 
tried to shape public opinion in aid of their cause). 
28. H.R. 2500, 105th Cong. (1997); Gentile, supra note 26 (“‘I could see the
Commission wasn’t going to put in a needs based provision in their recommendations, so 
we went ahead and drafted a bill.’” (quoting Rep. McCollum)). See generally Robin 
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Although Rep. McCollum was not a member of the relevant 
Judiciary Committee subcommittee,29 his bill sought to alter 
consumer bankruptcy in accordance with industry proposals and 
the prominent media portrayals of the bankruptcy crisis.30 
In the winter of 1998, the chair of the relevant Judiciary 
Committee subcommittee (Rep. George Gekas (R-Pa.)) introduced 
another bankruptcy bill, House Bill 3150.31 This bill contained 
consumer bankruptcy provisions that essentially replicated 
House Bill 2500, but it also included extensive business 
bankruptcy and bankruptcy tax amendments.32 Rep. McCollum 
also supported this bill,33 and the bill began its multi-year 
bipartisan odyssey through Congress. 
Rep. Gekas’s subcommittee held a series of hearings that 
included many credit industry representatives and some 
members of the bankruptcy establishment as witnesses.34 The 
bankruptcy establishment expressed concern about policy issues, 
drafting problems, and the lack of evidence to support significant 
changes in any event.35 The bankruptcy establishment was also 
concerned that the bill would proceed with undue haste, 
departing from the tradition of deliberation that had 
accompanied large legislative changes in the past.36 These 
legislative hearings were pro forma, however, and seemed to 
have little effect on the bill’s development. 
Like the House, the Senate essentially preempted the 
Bankruptcy Commission’s efforts with its own bill. One day after 
the Commission submitted its report, two senators—Senators 
Jeweler, Survey of the Impact of Advisory Study Commissions, Congressional Res. Serv., 
The Library of Congress CRS-9 (Sept. 3, 1997) (noting that “in some instances, advisory 
commissions are hampered when they deal with subjects that are controversial, political, 
and subject to strong emotional convictions,” and including among factors that affect 
Commission efficacy “lack of consensus about the nature of impact of the problem” or 
“controversy over solutions”). 
29. See Bill McCollum, Biography, at http://www.leadingauthorities.com/14371/Bill_
McCollum.htm (2004). 
30. See generally Victoria F. Nourse & Jane S. Schacter, The Politics of Legislative
Drafting: A Congressional Case Study, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 575, 587 (2002) (reporting that 
Senate staffers identified bankruptcy as having particularly extensive industry lobbyist 
involvement, especially on the House side). 
31. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1998, H.R. 3150, 105th Cong (1998).
32. §§ 302, 402–415, 802–818 (setting forth business requirements, such as
requiring credit counseling, and tax requirements, such as interest rates on tax claims 
and information to be specified by the filer). 
33. See H.R. 3150 (listing Rep. McCollum as a cosponsor).
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Charles Grassley (R-Iowa) and Richard Durbin (D-Ill.)—
introduced the Consumer Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1997, 
Senate Bill 1301.37 Later in the 105th Congress, Sen. Grassley 
would also introduce a business and tax bankruptcy bill,38 which 
ultimately was folded into the large omnibus bill. 
Sen. Grassley’s subcommittee held hearings,39 although Sen. 
Grassley viewed those who voiced opposition to his bill as a 
“fringe element.”40 But the bill did evolve, particularly as Senate 
Democrats became more actively involved in the discussions.41 
The Clinton Administration supported most of both the 
House and Senate bankruptcy bills.42 After all, the bill’s 
proponents framed the bill as an issue of personal 
responsibility, which was a theme of the welfare reform that 
President Clinton had supported.43 Yet the Administration’s 
37. S. 1301, 105th Cong. (1997). This bill differed from the House Bill in its
approach to screening Chapter 7 debtors and in its amendments directed toward abusive 
creditor practices. Compare S. 1301, with H.R. 3150. Perhaps for these reasons, the 
Grassley-Durbin bill later would be characterized as the “liberal” or “moderate” bill that 
was “more friendly to borrowers.” See, e.g., Dan Morgan, Creditors’ Money Talks Louder in 
Bankruptcy Debates: Consumer Groups Fight New Curbs on Insolvent Debtors, WASH. 
POST, June 1, 1999, at A4 [hereinafter Morgan, Creditors’ Money]. 
38. Business Bankruptcy Reform Act, S. 1914, 105th Cong. (1998).
39. See, e.g., Hearing on S. 1301, supra note 1, 1998 WL 8993073 (witness list);
Hearing on S. 1301, supra note 1, 1998 WL 8993336 (opening statement of Chuck 
Grassley, Chairman, S. Judiciary Subcomm. on Admin. Oversight and the Courts). 
40. 144 CONG. REC. S9093 (1998) (statement of Sen. Grassley).
41. As one example, Senate Democrats were interested in promoting responsible
lending practices outside of the bankruptcy context. See, e.g., S. Amends. 3540–3617, 
105th Cong., 144 CONG. REC. S9942–10,728, S10,843–44 (1998) (showing amendments to 
Senate Bill 1301, including extensions of credit to underage consumers and enhanced 
disclosures); Richard Durbin, Editorial, Credit Blues: Banks, Consumers Both 
Responsible, PANTAGRAPH, Dec. 26, 1997, at A11. For example, the bill as passed amended 
the Truth in Lending Act to require that credit-card statements include an estimate of the 
borrower’s total cost of making only the recommended minimum monthly payment. 
Consumer Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1998, H.R. 3150, 105th Cong. § 209(a) (1998). 
42. Executive Office of the President, Office of Mgmt. & Budget, Statement of
Administration Policy on H.R. 3150—Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1998 (June 10, 1998) 
[hereinafter Statement of Administration Policy on H.R. 3150] (noting that although the 
Clinton Administration supported debtor responsibility for those with the means to pay, it 
did not support House Bill 3150 in its then present form), http://www. 
whitehouse.gov/omb/legislative/sap/105-2/HR3150-h.html; Digest, WASH. POST, May 9, 
1998, at C1 (showing that the Clinton Administration opposed the House Bill because it 
lacked sufficient debtor protections). The Department of Justice previously had submitted 
twenty-four pages of detailed commentary. See Letter from Ann M. Harkins, Acting 
Assistant Attorney General, U.S. Department of Justice, to Hon. Henry J. Hyde, 
Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary (May 7, 1998) [hereinafter Letter from Ann M. 
Harkins] (on file with the Houston Law Review). 
43. See generally A. Mechele Dickerson, America’s Uneasy Relationship with the
Working Poor, 51 HASTINGS L.J. 17, 51 & n.144 (1999) (describing the categories of 
debtors and identifying irresponsible spending as the primary cause of debt in two of the 
three categories). For similar reasons, moderate and conservative Democrats generally 
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support was not iron-clad: it developed concerns about discrete 
aspects of the bill and preferred the Senate Bill to the House 
Bill.44 
In the House, many Democrats supported the bill 
notwithstanding Administration concerns, and the bill easily 
passed by a 306–118 vote on June 10, 1998.45 The Senate 
overwhelmingly approved its own bill 97–1 on September 23, 
1998, with only the late Sen. Paul Wellstone (D-Minn.) voting 
against it.46 In the reconciliation process, however, lawmakers 
excluded most Democrats from the negotiations, omitted or 
watered down most of the provisions that Senate Democrats had 
incorporated into the bill, and added provisions that many 
Senate Democrats would find objectionable.47 
supported the bankruptcy bill. See, e.g., New Democrats Online, Message of the Week, 
New Democrats Support Bankruptcy Reform (Feb. 26, 2001) (expressing view that 
bankruptcy has become a first option for debtors due to the lack of stigma associated with 
bankruptcy), http://www.ndol.org/print.cfm?contentid=3099. “Personal responsibility” is a 
key value for New Democrats. Id. 
44. See Statement of Administration Policy on H.R. 3150, supra note 42 (criticizing,
among other things, House Bill 3150’s “rigid and arbitrary means test” for determining 
debtor ability to pay); Digest, supra note 42. The Department of Justice previously had 
submitted twenty-four pages of detailed commentary. See Letter from Ann M. Harkins, 
supra note 42, at 1 (advocating rejection of House Bill’s means test). 
45. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1998, H.R. 3150, House Roll Call Vote #225, 105th
Cong. (June 10, 1998), http://clerk.house.gov/evs/1998/roll225.xml. As discussed later, a 
challenge to garnering maximum support was a provision that capped the amount of 
homestead exemption that a state could provide, which was problematic for 
representatives from states such as Texas and Florida. This exemption historically has 
been controversial. See, e.g., Eric Posner, The Political Economy of the Bankruptcy Reform 
Act of 1978, 96 MICH. L. REV. 47, 94–108 (1997) (reviewing homestead exemption’s origin 
as a mechanism for sparsely populated states such as Texas to encourage migration from 
other states). Rep. Gekas successfully sponsored a floor House amendment to eliminate 
the cap. H. Amend. 666, H.R. 3150, House Roll Call Vote #222, 105th Cong. (June 10, 
1998) (passing Gekas’s amendment, 222–204), http://clerk.house.gov/evs/1998/roll222.xml. 
46. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1998, H.R. 3150, Senate Roll Call Vote #284, 105th
Cong. (Sept. 23, 1998) (passing House Bill 3150 with text of Senate Bill 1301 as amended 
by vote of 97–1, with Sen. Wellstone as the lone dissenter), http://www.senate.gov/ 
legislative/LIS/roll_call_lists/roll_call_vote_cfm.cfm?congress=105&session=2&vote=0028
4; Who Cast That Lone Vote Against S. 1301?, 8 CONSUMER BANKR. NEWS, Oct. 22, 1998, 
at 4, 4 (“‘Unfortunately, thanks to a well-orchestrated, well-funded lobbying campaign by 
the credit card industry, the voices of these people were drowned out today. It’s another 
case in Washington of well-organized, high-paid lobbyists carrying the day at the expense 
of ordinary citizens and consumers.’” (quoting Sen. Wellstone)). 
47. For example, the lawmakers included provisions banning class actions against
lenders who violate certain provisions of bankruptcy law. See H.R. REP. NO. 105-794 
§§ 116–117, at 19–20 (1998); Caroline E. Mayer, Negotiators Complete Bankruptcy Reform
Bill, WASH. POST, Oct. 8, 1998, at E1 [hereinafter Mayer, Negotiators Complete
Bankruptcy Reform Bill] (quoting the comments of angered Sen. Durbin, who was
excluded from bill reconciliation); Schroeder & Schlesinger, supra note 4 (noting Durbin’s
threats to filibuster the bill based on his belief that the bill was too procreditor);
Katharine Q. Seelye, Republicans Agree to New Limits on Consumer Bankruptcy Filings, 
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 1998, at A1 [hereinafter Seelye, Republicans Agree to New Limits] 
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The House easily passed this conference report bill by a vote 
of 300–125, with plenty of Democrat support, on October 9, 
1998.48 Due to a filibuster threat preventing further action, the 
Senate voted only to consider the conference report.49 
Notwithstanding overwhelming support, the 105th Congress 
adjourned with no enactment of a bankruptcy bill. 
B. 106th Congress (1999–2000)
Early in the 106th Congress, Sen. Grassley and Rep. Gekas
reintroduced the failed conference report with some additional 
provisions, now hundreds of pages,50 in both the Senate and 
House.51 Again, the House easily approved the bill on May 5, 
1999 by a vote of 313–108.52 
Given the events at the end of the 105th Congress, one 
might have expected Senate Democrats to oppose the bill or be 
(quoting Sen. Durbin as saying that the Senate Bill “‘has been devastated in a closed-door 
Republican conference’”); see also Letter from Jacob J. Lew, Director, Office of 
Management and Budget, Executive Office of the President, to Hon. Trent Lott (Oct. 9, 
1998) (on file with the Houston Law Review) (making veto threat). 
48. H.R. REP. NO. 105-794, House Roll Call Vote #506, 105th Cong. (Oct. 9, 1998),
http://clerk.house.gov/evs/1998/roll506.xml. 
49. Motion to Proceed to Consider Conference Report on H.R. 3150, Senate Roll Call
Vote #313, 105th Cong. (Oct. 9, 1998) (94–2), http://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll_ 
call_lists/roll_call_vote_cfm.cfm?congress=105&session=2&vote=00313; Bankruptcy Bill 
Dies a Slow Death as Term Ends, CREDIT CARD NEWS, Oct. 15, 1998, at 1, available at 
1998 WL 14086506. 
50. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1999, H.R. 833, 106th Cong. §§ 101–1130 (1999).
51. Congress Returns to an Active Legislative Agenda, supra note 4; “Dear
Colleague” Letter from Reps. Gekas, Boucher, McCollum, and Moran (Feb. 25, 1999) (on 
file with the Houston Law Review) (explaining that this was same bill 300 members had 
voted for in the last congressional session and seeking bipartisan support); see also Letter 
from Dennis K. Burke, Acting Assistant Attorney General, U.S. Department of Justice, to 
Hon. George W. Gekas, Chairman, Subcommittee on Commercial and Administrative Law 
(Mar. 24, 1999) (on file with the Houston Law Review) (detailing thirty-five pages of 
Department of Justice commentary on the proposed bill); Letter from Jacob Lew, Director 
of the Executive Office of the President, Office of Management and Budget, to Hon. John 
Conyers, Member, Committee on the Judiciary (Mar. 23, 1999) (on file with the Houston 
Law Review) (“Our position from last year [on the Conference Report] has not changed.”); 
Executive Office of the President, Office of Mgmt. & Budget, Statement of Administration 
Policy on H.R. 833—Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1999 (May 5, 1999) (reporting the Clinton 
Administration’s strong opposition to H.R. 833), http://www.whitehouse.gov/ 
omb/legislative/sap/106-1/HR833-h.html. 
52. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1999, H.R. 833, House Roll Call Vote #115, 106th
Cong. (May 5, 1999), http://clerk.house.gov/evs/1999/roll115.xml. As in the 105th 
Congress, Rep. Gekas successfully sought to diffuse objections to a homestead exemption 
cap by permitting the states to opt out of the cap. H. Amend. 54 to H.R. 833, 106th Cong. 
(1999) (agreed to by voice vote). In addition, Judiciary Committee Chair Henry Hyde (R-
Ill.) had tried to replace the means test with a more discretionary approach to screening 
cases, but Congress overruled him. H. Amend. 83 to H.R. 833, 106th Cong. (1999) (failing 
184–238); see also Rep. Henry J. Hyde, Editorial, Why Squeeze Every Last Penny from the 
Bankrupt?, N.Y. TIMES, May 18, 1999, at A23 (justifying his amendment). 
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skeptical of the prospect of a balanced product.53 Nonetheless, the 
bill passed 83–14 on February 2, 2000,54 after the Senate had 
engaged in another round of floor amendments.55 
The House and Senate Bills were similar but not identical,56 
and the reconciliation process again was not a model of 
negotiation and compromise. Bill proponents excluded many 
Democrats and inserted their preferred version of the legislation 
into the shell of a moribund embassy security conference report.57 
Again, much of the Senate’s long amendment process was largely 
for naught. 
The House adopted the bankruptcy conference report on 
October 12, 2000 by a voice vote.58 Notwithstanding the changes 
made in conference, a veto-proof majority of the Senate (70–28) 
voted favorably on the conference report on December 7, 2000.59 
President Clinton then “pocket-vetoed” the bill because of several 
discrete points of contention.60 Like the 105th Congress, the 
53. Refer to note 47 supra and accompanying text.
54. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 2000, H.R. 833, Senate Roll Call Vote #5, 106th Cong.
(Feb. 2, 2000), http://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll_call_lists/roll_call_vote_cfm.cfm? 
congress=106&session=2&vote=00005. 
55. S. Amends. 1695–2530, 106th Cong., 145 CONG. REC. S11143–71, S14102–11
(1999). Several Senate Democrats also unsuccessfully introduced an alternative bill, 
which was based on the bill that had passed the Senate 97–1 the prior year. “Dear 
Colleague” Letter from Sens. Durbin, Leahy, Kennedy, and Feingold (May 14, 1999) (on 
file with the Houston Law Review) 
56. See generally Am. Bankr. Inst., Summary of Key Areas of Disagreement
S. 625/H.R. 833 Conference (2000) (on file with the Houston Law Review); Letter from
Jacob J. Lew, Director, Office of Management and Budget, Executive Office of the
President, to Hon. Orrin G. Hatch (May 12, 2000) (on file with the Houston Law Review)
(comparing the House and Senate Bills).
57. See Bankruptcy Reform Act of 2000, H.R. 2415, 106th Cong. (2000) (“To enhance
security of United States missions and personnel overseas, to authorize appropriations for 
the Department of State for fiscal year 2000, and for other purposes.”). This resolution 
had passed by voice vote and unanimous consent earlier. Id. See generally Press Release, 
Statement of U.S. Senator Paul Wellstone on the 11th Hour Attempt to Pass So-Called 
Bankruptcy Reform Legislation, Common Dreams Progressive Newswire, at http://www. 
commondreams.org/news2000/1012-04.htm (Oct. 12, 2000) (“House and Senate 
Republicans have taken a secretly negotiated bankruptcy bill and stuffed it into the 
hollowed-out husk of the State Department authorization bill . . . .”). Sen. Grassley and 
Majority Leader Trent Lott also introduced another omnibus bankruptcy reform bill, 
Senate Bill 3046, which did not go forward. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 2000, S. 3046, 
106th Cong (2000). 
58. H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 106-970, House Voice Vote, 106th Cong. (Oct. 12, 2000),
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d106:HR02415:@@@X; see also Press Release, Rep. 
George W. Gekas, Bankruptcy Reform Bill Passes: Bill Moves to Senate; Passage 
Expected (Oct. 12, 2000) (on file with the Houston Law Review). 
59. H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 108-970, Senate Roll Call Vote #297, 106th Cong. (Dec. 7,
2000), http://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll_call_lists/roll_call_vote_cfm.cfm?congress 
=106&session=2&vote=00297. 
60. See, e.g., Associated Press, Legislation to Overhaul Laws on Bankruptcy Dies as
President Fails to Sign It, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 20, 2000, at A32 (“‘President Clinton let the 
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106th Congress adjourned without enactment of a bankruptcy 
bill, notwithstanding overwhelming support. 
C. 107th Congress (2001–2002)
In 2001, the text of the pocket-vetoed conference report was
reintroduced61 and passed 306–108 in the House on March 1, 
2001.62 The Senate’s approval (83–15) of a nearly identical bill 
followed less than two weeks later.63 Yet Congress took no further 
action until 2002, when Democrats controlled the Senate by a 
tiny majority.64 Although the bill remained hundreds of pages 
long and contained many provisions that had never been 
seriously debated, public Congressional discussion of bankruptcy 
focused on two narrow but salient issues. First, lawmakers 
disputed how to deal appropriately with generous or unlimited 
state homestead exemptions that applied in bankruptcy cases. 
Lawmakers found a compromise on this issue in the spring of 
2002.65
Second, lawmakers disputed the need for a specific exception 
to discharge for debts arising from violations of the Freedom of 
American people down by pocket vetoing the bipartisan bankruptcy reform bill.’” (quoting 
Sen. Grassley)); Stephen Labaton, Promised Veto Appears to Doom Congressional 
Agreement on Overhauling Bankruptcy Law, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 2000, at A30 
[hereinafter Labaton, Promised Veto] (“[O]bjections raised by the White House were not 
central to the issues and are excuses.” (quoting lobbyist Ed Yingling)); Press Release, 
Gekas Denounces Clinton Pocket Veto of Bankruptcy Reform; Gekas Encouraged by Bush 
Administration (Dec. 21, 2000). For some of the stated reasons for the pocket veto, refer to 
note 209 infra and accompanying text. 
61. News Release, U.S. House of Reps., Comm. on the Judiciary, Committee Passes
Bankruptcy Reform Legislation, at http://www.house.gov/judiciary/news021501.htm (Feb. 
15, 2001) (noting that “this legislation is virtually identical to the conference report on 
H.R. 2415, the ‘Gekas-Grassley Bankruptcy Reform Act of 2000’ that was pocket vetoed 
last December by then-President Clinton”). 
62. Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act, H.R. 333, House
Roll Call Vote #25, 107th Cong. (Mar. 1, 2001), http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2001/roll025. 
xml. 
63. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 2001, S. 420, Senate Roll Call Vote #36, 107th Cong.
(Mar. 15, 2001), http://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll_call_lists/roll_call_vote_cfm. 
cfm?congress=107&session=1&vote=00036. 
64. The time delay is likely explained by other events, such as Sen. Jefford’s leaving
the Republican party, Balance of Power: “A Struggle for Our Leaders to Deal With Me and 
for Me to Deal With Them”, N.Y. TIMES, May 25, 2001, at A20 (displaying transcript of 
Sen. Jefford’s public announcement that he was leaving the Republican Party), the 
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, see Todd S. Purdum & Robin Toner, A Day of 
Terror: The Federal Government: Driven Underground, Administration and Congressional 
Officials Stay on the Job, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12, 2001, at A5, and the discovery of anthrax 
in the congressional buildings, Philip Shenon, A Nation Challenged: Discovery on 
Anthrax; Suspicious Letter to a 2nd Senator, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 17, 2001, at A1. 
65. See Philip Shenon, Congress Panel Agrees to Limit Home Shield in Bankruptcy,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 24, 2002, at C1. 
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Access to Clinic Entrances (FACE) Act.66 Some Senate Democrats 
conditioned their support for the bill on the addition of a new 
exception to discharge, while other members of Congress strongly 
opposed such an amendment.67 Lawmakers reached what they 
thought was a suitable compromise on this issue in the summer 
of 2002,68 and the consumer credit industry retained Kenneth 
Starr, at that time an attorney with the law firm of Kirkland and 
Ellis, to assure antiabortion lawmakers that the legislation 
would have “little practical effect” on the rights of abortion 
protesters.69 
Neither the Starr letter nor the language of the compromise 
swayed enough members of the House to ensure passage. In the 
post-midterm election lame-duck session, members of the House 
of Representatives voted against bringing up the conference 
report (243–172),70 with antiabortion representatives 
substantially tipping the scales.71 Like the two prior Congresses, 
the 107th Congress ended without enactment of the omnibus 
bankruptcy bill. 
D. 108th Congress (2003–2004)
By the beginning of the 108th Congress, plenty had changed
since lawmakers initially introduced a bankruptcy bill in 1997. 
In addition to the obvious change in the economic climate and the 
change in presidents, voters had sent home Reps. McCollum and 
Gekas, who were two of the original House sponsors.72 
66. See generally Margaret Whiteman, Comment, F.A.C.E.-ing Up to Bankruptcy
Reform: Why a Separate Provision Denying Discharge of Debts Arising Out of Abortion 
Clinic Violence Is Redundant, 108 PENN. ST. L. REV. 395, 395–96, 405–06 (2003). 
67. Id.
68. See Linda Punch, Bankruptcy Reform: Try, Try Again, CREDIT CARD MGMT.,
Feb. 27, 2003, at 32, 32 (chronicling the myriad legislative attempts at bankruptcy 
reform, including compromise on the FACE amendment), available at 2003 WL 11823279. 
69. Letter from Kenneth Starr, to Hon. Steve Barlett, President, The Financial
Services Roundtable (Oct. 4, 2002) (on file with the Houston Law Review). 
70. Waiving Points of Order Against the Conference Report on H.R. 333,
Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act, H.R. Res. 606, House Roll 
Call Vote #478, 107th Cong. (Nov. 14, 2002), http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2002/roll478.xml. 
71. Right before going out of session, House leaders again called a vote on the bill
stripped of the FACE amendment. The House passed this version (244–116) but without 
expectation of further Senate movement. Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer 
Protection Act, H.R. 333, House Roll Call Vote #484, 107th Cong. (Nov. 15, 2002), 
http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2002/roll484.xml. 
72. Rep. McCollum ran for Senate and lost. FED. ELECTION COMM’N, 2000 U.S.
SENATE RESULTS, http://www.fec.gov/pubrec/fe2000/2000senate.htm (last visited Nov. 12, 
2004). After redistricting, Rep. Gekas encountered a longtime incumbent conservative 
Democrat, Rep. Tim Holden, and lost. CLERK OF THE HOUSE OF REPS., STATISTICS OF THE 
CONGRESSIONAL ELECTION OF NOV. 5, 2002, at 39 (2003). 
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Nonetheless, early in the 108th Congress, Rep. Jim 
Sensenbrenner (R-Wis.) reintroduced the omnibus bill, absent 
the FACE amendment.73 The bill quickly passed the House on 
March 19, 2003 (315–113).74 
After almost ten months, the House tried to force action in 
the Senate. Lawmakers added the entire omnibus bill to a one-
page reauthorization of Chapter 12 (family farmer bankruptcy), 
which had already passed the Senate.75 The House passed this 
bill by a vote of 265–99 in January 2004.76 Sen. Tom Daschle (D-
S.D.) expressed doubt in the press that the House’s approach 
would be successful,77 and as of this writing, lawmakers have 
made no further progress.78 
Thus, even though large majorities of lawmakers have 
expressed support for the omnibus bankruptcy bill, it is not law. 
The bankruptcy establishment has had very little direct 
influence, notwithstanding attempts to provide substantive 
input.79 As is discussed in the following two sections, however, 
evaluating news media coverage offers another dimension to the 
story of this bill’s long and tortured path. 
73. Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2003, H.R. 975,
House Roll Call Vote #74, 108th Cong. (Mar. 19, 2003), http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2003/ 
roll074.xml. 
74. That bill differs from the prior bill in that it includes a few legislative responses
to recent corporate scandals. See H. Amend. 8 to H.R. 975, 108th Cong. (2003) (amending 
House Bill 975 to extend the reach-back period for rescinding fraudulent transfers and to 
require courts, in some circumstances, “to reinstate retiree benefits that a corporate 
debtor modified” just prior to filing), http://thomas.loc.gov/bss/d108/d108bill.html. 
75. S. 1920, 108th Cong. (2004).
76. To Extend for 6 Months the Period for Which Chapter 12 of Title 11 of the
United States Code Is Reenacted, S. 1920, House Roll Call Vote #10, 108th Cong. (Jan. 28, 
2004), http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2004/roll010.xml. 
77. Dawn Kopecki, U.S. House GOP Tries to Resurrect Stalled Bankruptcy Bill, 
DOW JONES BUS. WIRE, Jan. 28, 2004 (citing Daschle stating that Democrats have enough 
votes to sustain a filibuster in Senate), available at 1/29/04 DJINS 12:37:00 (Westlaw). 
78. See Molly M. Peterson, House Passes Bankruptcy Bill, but Senate Democrats
Object, CONG. DAILY, Jan. 29, 2004, available at 2004 WL 65987404. In the meantime, 
Chapter 12 expired. See generally Melissa B. Jacoby, The Bankruptcy Code at Twenty-Five 
and the Next Generation of Lawmaking, 78 AM. BANKR. L.J. 221, 226–230 (2004) 
(describing legislative developments relating to Chapter 12 for family farmers). 
79. Press Release, U.S. Sen. Russ Feingold, Statement of U.S. Senator Russ
Feingold on Legislation to Restore Chapter 12 Bankruptcy Protection for Farmers (Sept. 
29, 2004), http://feingold.senate.gov/~feingold/statements/04/09/2004929B16.html. 
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III. THE RELEVANCE OF MEDIA TREATMENT TO DEVELOPMENTS IN
BANKRUPTCY LEGISLATION 
News media play a varied and complex role in American 
lawmaking and policymaking.80 Courts increasingly use news in 
judicial opinions81 and attribute statistics to news sources.82 
80. Scholars in other disciplines debate characterizations of news making as an
institution and its precise relationship to law and policy, but apparently do not debate its 
importance. See, e.g., TIMOTHY E. COOK, GOVERNING WITH THE NEWS: THE NEWS MEDIA 
AS A POLITICAL INSTITUTION 4 (1998) (characterizing news as a “political institution” and 
discussing differences between political scientists’ and sociologists’ conception of 
journalists); GAYE TUCHMAN, MAKING NEWS: A STUDY IN THE CONSTRUCTION OF REALITY 
3–5 (1978) (describing news as “first and foremost a social institution”); see also HERBERT 
J. GANS, DECIDING WHAT’S NEWS, 4–7 (1979) (characterizing content analysis of news
reporting as painting a “picture of America”); M. ETHAN KATSH, LAW IN A DIGITAL WORLD
9 (1995) (describing law and media as “two of society’s more powerful forces” and
expressing surprise that links between the two forces receive “negligible attention”);
MICHAEL SCHUDSON, THE SOCIOLOGY OF NEWS 6–7 (2003) (asserting that journalists
“construct” but do not “conjure” the world).
81. See, e.g., John J. Hasko, Persuasion in the Court: Nonlegal Materials in U.S.
Supreme Court Opinions, 94 LAW LIBR. J. 427 passim (2002) (studying the increased use 
of nonlegal sources in U.S. Supreme Court decisions); Frederick Schauer & Virginia J. 
Wise, Nonlegal Information and the Delegalization of Law, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 495 passim 
(2000); see also David Nimmer, Appreciating Legislative History: The Sweet and Sour 
Spots of the DMCA’s Commentary, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 909, 958 (2002) (describing Judge 
Kozinski’s use of sources, including newspapers and magazines not in briefs or the 
record); LaShanda D. Taylor, Creating A Causal Connection: From Prenatal Drug Abuse 
to Imminent Harm, 25 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 383, 396–97 (1999) (noting family 
court use of newspaper and magazine articles). 
82. See, e.g., Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564, 567 & n.2 (2002) (citing New York
Times for Internet use estimate); A.D. Bedell Wholesale Co. v. Philip Morris Inc., 263 F.3d 
239, 241–42 & n.9 (3d Cir. 2001) (citing New York Times for number of state lawsuits 
against tobacco companies); Morrison v. Hall, 261 F.3d 896, 904 n.7 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing 
Los Angeles Times for adult prisoner literacy rate and correlation between literacy and 
recidivism); In re Mercer, 246 F.3d 391, 401 (5th Cir. 2001) (citing papers for estimates of 
cost of bankruptcy per year in total and by household); Hutchins v. D.C., 188 F.3d 531, 
570 n.35 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (Rogers & Tatel, JJ., dissenting) (citing Washington Post for 
curfew effect on reducing juvenile crime); Middleton v. City of Flint, 92 F.3d 396, 407 (6th 
Cir. 1996) (citing Los Angeles Times and New York Times for percentage of Indian-
American owners in lodging and motel business); Roulette v. City of Seattle, 97 F.3d 300, 
315 & n.5 (9th Cir. 1996) (Norris, Pregerson & Tashima, JJ., dissenting) (citing papers for 
rich-poor disparity in U.S.); Carroll v. Comm’r, 71 F.3d 1228, 1230 & n.1 (6th Cir. 1995) 
(citing Washington Post for prevalence of tax documents lost by IRS each year); United 
States v. Smith, 27 F.3d 649, 668 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (Sentelle, J., dissenting) (citing papers 
for estimated numbers of illegal immigrants and incarcerated illegal immigrants); United 
States v. Milligan, 17 F.3d 177, 183–84 (6th Cir. 1994) (citing Los Angeles Times for 
health insurance statistics); United States v. Garrett, 984 F.2d 1402, 1404 & n.1 (5th Cir. 
1993) (citing New York Times for airport security firearm confiscation statistics); Hous. 
Opportunities Made Equal, Inc. v. Cincinnati Enquirer, Inc., 943 F.2d 644, 666 & n.13 
(6th Cir. 1991) (Keith, J., dissenting) (citing papers for prevalence of housing 
discrimination); Hammer v. Gross, 932 F.2d 842, 852 (9th Cir. 1991) (Kozinski & Nelson, 
JJ., concurring in part) (citing Los Angeles Times for drunk driving injury or death 
statistics); McKinney v. Anderson, 924 F.2d 1500, 1507 & n.21 (9th Cir. 1991) (citing New 
York Times for proportion of smokers in prison nationwide); People Against Nuclear 
Energy v. NRC, 678 F.2d 222, 243 n.37 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (Wilkey, J., dissenting) (citing 
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Lawyers engage in media management as part of their litigation 
strategies.83 Scholars have studied media coverage of a range of 
law and policy-related issues, including executive appointments,84 
judicial elections,85 presidential elections,86 and press accounts of 
comments that victims’ families have made in capital cases.87  
The study of news coverage of legislation should be at least 
as fruitful as studying these other lines of inquiry. Reporters and 
legislators “coproduce” both news and policy.88 News media offer 
Washington Post for average loss of life in coal mining). 
83. See, e.g., RICHARD K. SHERWIN, WHEN LAW GOES POP: THE VANISHING LINE 
BETWEEN LAW AND POPULAR CULTURE 147–48 (2000) (reviewing trial lawyers’ 
management of pretrial publicity and media messages to sway popular opinion and 
“demoralize,” “antagonize,” and encourage plea bargaining); Tom Goldstein, The 
Transformation of Legal Journalism, 66 U. CIN. L. REV. 895, 900 (1998) (examining 
lawyers as spokespersons in media during high publicity trials); Peter J. Gardner, Media 
at the Gates: Panic! Stress! Ethics?, VT. B.J., Sept. 2001, at 39, 40–41 (providing lawyers 
with a succinct approach to media relations); Kateri Walsh, Engaging the Media: What 
Lawyers Should Know When Talking to Reporters, OR. ST. B. BULL., Oct. 2001, at 9 
(identifying several media related strategies lawyers can adopt to inform the general 
public of the legal process). 
84. Laurel Leff, The Making of a “Quota Queen”: News Media and the Bias of
Objectivity, in FEMINISM, MEDIA, AND THE LAW 27, 27–28 (Martha A. Fineman & Martha 
T. McCluskey eds., 1997) (asserting that the objectivity norm “steered the media toward
familiar constructs about race and gender to make sense of the controversy over [Lani
Guinier’s] appointment,” and “enabled journalists to disclaim responsibility” for
characterizing Guinier as a left-wing extremist and a “quota queen”).
85. Joseph D. Kearney & Howard B. Eisenberg, The Print Media and Judicial
Elections: Some Case Studies from Wisconsin, 85 MARQ. L. REV. 593, 769–70, 775–77 
(2002) (studying whether readers gained sufficient information from print media to vote 
on the Abrahamson-Rose election and finding that information “seems to lack the 
educative component needed to overcome the general public ignorance” about judges and 
judicial elections). 
86. See, e.g., JAMIESON & WALDMAN, supra note 7, at 4–7 (chronicling the media’s
coverage of the 2000 presidential election and the resulting lawsuit); SIDNEY KRAUS & 
DENNIS DAVIS, THE EFFECTS OF MASS COMMUNICATION ON POLITICAL BEHAVIOR 58–59 
(1976) (researching the television coverage of the presidential debates and its effect on the 
voting public). 
87. Samuel R. Gross & Daniel J. Matheson, What They Say at the End: Capital
Victims’ Families and the Press, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 486 (2003) (concluding that the 
media gathers reactions from victims’ families as a fundamental component of assembling 
an execution news story). 
88. COOK, supra note 80, at 3, 10–13 (emphasizing that political actors and
journalists “interact in a constant but implicit series of negotiations over who controls the 
agenda”); STEPHEN HESS, LIVE FROM CAPITOL HILL! STUDIES OF CONGRESS AND THE 
MEDIA 104–07 (1991) (identifying Congress members’ efforts to influence media coverage, 
despite research indicating that Congress “overestimate[s] the extent of television 
coverage and hence its importance in the legislative and electoral processes”); KATSH, 
supra note 80, at 9 (“[L]aw and media are intimately linked institutions.”); KRAUS 
& DAVIS, supra note 86, at 123–24 (describing the centrality of the media to policymaking, 
particularly since the rise of television imagery); SCHUDSON, supra note 80, at 21 
(characterizing U.S. presidents as parajournalists); Frank R. Baumgartner et al., Media 
Attention and Congressional Agendas, in DO THE MEDIA GOVERN?, supra note 7, at 349, 
350 (“Sometimes one leads and sometimes the other, and often both are following the 
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new legislation ideas,89 and legislators and others use the media 
as outlets to construct and highlight public problems and to gain 
support for particular solutions.90 
actions of some third party . . . .”); Robert H. Giles, The Media and Government 
Regulation in the Great Tradition of Muckraking, 11 KANS. J.L. PUB. POL’Y 567, 570 
(2002) (“[N]ews plays a formative role in the development of policy, of legislation, of 
regulations, of reform and in the overlay of politics that is so characteristic of our 
contemporary democracy.”); Jan Ellen Rein, Misinformation and Self-Deception in Recent 
Long-Term Care Policy Trends, 12 J.L. & POL. 195, 233–34 (1996) (identifying the media 
and insurance industry’s “profound effect on policy decisions at every level of 
government”); Achilles Skordas, Hegemonic Custom?, in UNITED STATES HEGEMONY AND 
THE FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 317, 323–24 (Michael Byers & Georg Nolte 
eds., 2003) (describing the media as a source of “public conscience,” playing a role in 
policymaking); Lucy A. Williams, Race, Rat Bites, and Unfit Mothers: How Media 
Discourse Informs Welfare Legislation Debate, 22 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1159, 1174 (1995) 
(arguing that media imaging affects poverty and welfare legislation). 
89. See, e.g., LAURA E. GÓMEZ, MISCONCEIVING MOTHERS: LEGISLATORS,
PROSECUTORS, AND THE POLITICS OF PRENATAL DRUG EXPOSURE 32 (1997) (hypothesizing 
bill sponsorship’s response in part to media construction of “crack baby”); Baumgartner et 
al., supra note 88, at 350 (asserting that news media “attention is an important 
determinant of which issues will manage to win space in the limited attentions of the 
public and of Congress”); Peter H. Huang et al., Derivatives on TV: A Tale of Two 
Derivatives Debacles in Prime-Time, 4 GREEN BAG 257, 266–67 (2001) (justifying partly 
study of media coverage on fact that society’s lawmakers watch television and noting that 
lawmakers cite news stories in pitches for reform); Nourse & Schacter, supra note 30, at 
584 (surveying Senate congressional staffers on sources used to choose and produce 
legislation). For a criticism of media’s lawmaking role, see WILLIS, supra note 10, at 154–
55 (concluding that media should not be held responsible for Congress’s agenda). 
90. See CATER, supra note 6, at 13–21 (positing that the media is the “means by
which government explains itself to the people”); COOK, supra note 80, at 11, 82–84, 110–
15 (stating media “influence perceptions of public moods, and in other ways shape the 
context of one legislator asking another for support” and discussing publicity functions of 
Congress and use of news media to gain legislative power for both practical and 
philosophical reasons while noting press secretaries find “the greater reach and credibility 
of newspapers makes them more useful than self-generated communications such as 
targeted mail or newsletters”); GÓMEZ, supra note 89, at 32 (portraying media as “free 
advertising” for legislators’ projects); GARY C. WOODWARD, PERSPECTIVES ON AMERICAN 
POLITICAL MEDIA 237 (1997) (arguing that popular media is crucial “when assessing the 
forms of American political discourse”); Ben H. Bagdikian, Congress and the Media: 
Partners in Propaganda, in CONGRESS AND THE NEWS MEDIA 388, 388–91 (A. William 
Bluem ed., 1974); Shanto Iyengar, Framing Responsibility for Political Issues: The Case of 
Poverty, in DO THE MEDIA GOVERN?, supra note 7, at 276, 276 (discussing the media’s 
significant influence on public opinion); Nancy J. Knauer, How Charitable Organizations 
Influence Federal Tax Policy: “Rent-Seeking” Charities or Virtuous Politicians?, 1996 WIS. 
L. REV. 971, 1051 (“Legislators support the charitable community in order to generate the
favorable voter perception that they are acting in the public interest.”); Francis E. Rourke,
Congressional Use of Publicity, in CONGRESS AND THE NEWS MEDIA, supra, at 128, 128
(discussing the battle between the legislature and the executive for control of the media);
Deborah A. Stone, Causal Stories and the Formation of Policy Agendas, 104 POL. SCI. Q.
281, 282 (1989) (illustrating imagemaking in policymaking and the way political actors
portray problems to garner support for preferred solutions). See generally SAM KERNELL, 
GOING PUBLIC: NEW STRATEGIES OF PRESIDENTIAL LEADERSHIP (2d ed. 1993) (outlining
politicians’ media management strategies); Shaviro, supra note 7, at 96 (“Press coverage
is a tool that [politicians] manipulate to enhance their reelection prospects and other
professional objectives.”). For an alternative way to build support for a legislative
1110 HOUSTON LAW REVIEW [41:4
Researchers who have directly explored media coverage of 
particular legislation have concluded that media coverage 
increases the possibility of legislative attention,91 sometimes 
regardless of the media portrayal’s accuracy.92 Media coverage 
also has the potential to change lawmakers’ approaches to 
dealing with an issue.93 Even if the media do not independently 
determine or influence Congressional attention, they may 
indirectly affect Congressional action, perhaps through 
influencing public opinion.94 The media may also help change the 
public’s understanding of legislation once enacted.95 Legal 
proposal, see Leonard A. Jason & Thomas Rose, Influencing the Passage of Child 
Passenger Restraint Legislation, 12 AM. J. OF COMMUNITY PSYCHOL. 485, 491–92 (1984) 
(evaluating the impact of sending child automobile injury data to legislators on the eve of 
legislative debate). 
91. See, e.g., Baumgartner et al., supra note 88, at 350, 359–63 (studying the
relevance of both the nature and frequency of media coverage, and finding, among other 
things, that media helped shift nuclear power debate toward negative safety issues, which 
in turn led to policy changes, and that media and Congressional attention on urban 
problems tracked each other). 
92. Paul Colomy & Laura Ross Greiner, Making Youth Violence Visible: The News
Media and the Summer of Violence, 77 DENV. U. L. REV. 661, 668–71, 683–88 (2000) 
(finding that the Denver Post gave higher profile and increased attention to crime during 
the summer of 1993 and that this increased attention was followed by heightened 
lawmaker receptiveness to legislation curbing violence even though crime statistics reveal 
only a “small but unspectacular upturn” in violent crimes during the summer of 1993). 
Professors Colomy and Greiner argue that the press was a “cultural entrepreneur” in its 
narrative techniques and “played a critical role in making youth violence a salient public 
issue.” Id. at 661, 679; GÓMEZ, supra note 89, at 29–33 (tracking press coverage and 
California state legislative activity related to “crack babies” by studying media coverage of 
drugs, pregnancy, and child abuse from 1985–1992 in two newspapers and fifty-seven 
bills and related materials in the California Legislature). For reviews of GÓMEZ, supra 
note 89, see generally Joseph R. Henry, 3 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 207 (1999) (book 
review) (recommending that Gómez track changes in the media’s tone over time); Linda 
G. Mills, Feminist Phallacies: The Politics of Prenatal Drug Exposure and the Power of
Law, 25 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 1215 (2000) (book review); Dorothy E. Roberts, Creating and
Solving the Problem of Drug Use During Pregnancy, 90 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1353
(2000) (book review); Karen D. Zivi, Who Is the Guilty Party? Rights, Motherhood, and the
Problem of Prenatal Drug Exposure, 34 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 237 (2000) (book review).
93. See Baumgartner et al., supra note 88, at 350, 362–63 (noting that changes in
governmental policy concerning societal issues are often preceded by media coverage of 
the issue); Denise Scheberle, Radon and Asbestos: A Study of Agenda Setting and Causal 
Stories, 22 POL’Y STUD. J. 74, 78, 82–83 (1994) (explaining that the media helped 
transform legislative involvement in asbestos from industry promotion to a health 
problem). 
94. For example, Paul Burstein studied New York Times coverage and other
potential determinants of congressional sponsorship and support for equal employment 
opportunity legislation between 1941 and 1972. PAUL BURSTEIN, DISCRIMINATION, JOBS, 
AND POLITICS: THE STRUGGLE FOR EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY IN THE UNITED 
STATES SINCE THE NEW DEAL 82–87 (1985). Burstein found only a weak correlation 
between media coverage and legislative sponsorship and support, but observed that media 
coverage may have had indirect effects, such as influencing public opinion. Id. 
95. See, e.g., Sarah F. Russell, Covering Women and Violence: Media Treatment of
VAWA’s Civil Rights Remedy, 9 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 327, 328–29, 334–35, 352–54 (2003) 
2004] NEGOTIATING BANKRUPTCY LEGISLATION 1111 
academics and professionals who want to understand, or perhaps 
influence, the legislative process might miss a piece of the puzzle 
if they do not investigate related news treatment.96 
Many studies also implicitly recognize and evaluate media 
coverage effects on policymaking.97 Social scientists have 
considered whether the media have roles in “agenda-setting,” 
namely, helping to rank the salience of particular issues.98 
Researchers question how the media “frame” issues or problems99 
(finding shift in press coverage of civil rights provision in Violence Against Women Act, and 
as result, finding the public less likely to conceptualize provision as civil rights or 
discrimination law); see also Lisa Finnegan Abdolian & Harold Takooshian, The USA 
PATRIOT Act: Civil Liberties, the Media, and Public Opinion, 30 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1429, 
1436–40 (2003) (stating that “it wasn’t until months after its passage that reporters took a 
hard look at the new law and began to question what its provisions meant” and observing a 
split in focus of coverage between liberal and conservative leaning news organizations). 
96. See KATSH, supra note 80, at 9 (describing law and media as “two of society’s
more powerful forces” and finding it “surprising . . . that the links between the two have 
received negligible attention”); Filler, supra note 10, at 1756 n.80 (surveying myriad 
articles that highlight the connection of the legal system to the public via the media and 
noting the dearth of scholarship that explores this relationship). 
97. See generally Sharon M. Friedman, Blueprint for Breakdown: Three Mile Island
and the Media Before the Accident, J. COMM., Winter 1981, at 116 (criticizing the biased 
press coverage of the Three Mile Island nuclear facility before the major accident of 
March 1979 and concluding that energy officials should invest more money and resources 
in public relations to give the local community a better understanding of the risks and 
benefits of nuclear energy); William A. Gamson & Kathryn E. Lasch, The Political Culture 
of Social Welfare Policy, in EVALUATING THE WELFARE STATE: SOCIAL AND POLITICAL 
PERSPECTIVES 397 (Shimon E. Spiro & Ephraim Yuchtman-Yaar eds., 1983) (presenting 
several models of understanding clusters of ideas that describe a political culture to the 
populace and identifying the various factors that make up the “culture” of an issue); 
William A. Gamson & Andre Modigliani, Media Discourse and Public Opinion on Nuclear 
Power: A Constructionist Approach, 95 AM. J. SOC. 1, 10–11 (1989) (analyzing relevant 
material during “critical discourse moments” between 1945 and the late 1980s as 
“indicat[ive] of the issue culture that people draw on to construct meaning” and offering 
detailed narrative of media discourse, with an emphasis on interpretive packages 
(progress, energy independence)). 
98. For a foundational study, see Maxwell E. McCombs & Donald L. Shaw, The
Agenda-Setting Function of Mass Media, 36 PUB. OPINION Q. 176, 176–85 (1972) 
(advocating the existence of high correlation between order of salience of public policy 
issues as covered in media and as described by undecided voters, using content analysis 
and surveys). See generally Everett M. Rogers et al., A Paradigmatic History of Agenda-
Setting Research, in DO THE MEDIA GOVERN?, supra note 7, at 225 (tracing the history of 
scholarly research on the agenda-setting process from the 1930s to the late 1990s). 
99. Professor Schudson defines framing as “principles of selection, emphasis, and
presentation composed of little tacit theories about what exists, what happens, and what 
matters.” SCHUDSON, supra note 80, at 35; see also JAMIESON & WALDMAN, supra note 7, 
at 122 (stating that the framing of issues is “the product of a give-and-take between 
political actors and reporters”). For framing broader than media, see generally JOSEPH R. 
GUSFIELD, THE CULTURE OF PUBLIC PROBLEMS: DRINKING-DRIVING AND THE SYMBOLIC 
ORDER 1–4 (1981) (discussing how our culture transforms certain situations into public 
problems and the inconsistencies between what actions are publicly criticized and 
privately have become “routine behavior”). 
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or focus on causal stories that lead to policy action.100 They have 
used these techniques to study media coverage of many issues, 
including crime waves,101 bridge collapse,102 affirmative action,103 
welfare,104 homelessness,105 and a variety of poverty-related 
conditions,106 and they have sometimes approached these studies 
100. See Stone, supra note 90, at 281–83, 299 (discussing how political actors portray
stories through the media in “ways calculated to gain support for their side”). 
101. See, e.g., Joel Best, “Road Warriors” on “Hair Trigger Highways”: Cultural
Resources and the Media’s Construction of the 1987 Freeway Shootings Problem, 61 SOC. 
INQUIRY 327, 331 (1991) (reporting on L.A. freeway violence and recounting alarming 
terms used, including “sudden evolution,” “trend,” “wave,” “spate,” “spree,” “upsurge,” 
“fad,” “rash,” “epidemic,” “plaguing,” and “reaching alarming proportions”); Mark 
Fishman, Crime Waves as Ideology, 25 SOC. PROBS. 531, 532 (1977) (studying reporting on 
crime against the elderly in New York City and finding a disproportionate focus on 
gruesome crimes compared to crime statistics indicating drop in murders of the elderly); 
see also Salma Ghanem & Dixie Evatt, Media Coverage and Public Concern About Crime: 
An Exploration of the Second Dimension of Agenda-Setting, cited in Maxwell McCombs & 
George Estrada, The News Media and the Pictures in Our Heads, in DO THE MEDIA 
GOVERN?, supra note 7, at 237, 245–46 (tracking media coverage and public opinions 
about crime in comparison to actual crime statistics); Hon. Ernestine S. Gray, The 
Media—Don’t Believe the Hype, 14 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 45, 47 (2003) (declaring that 
media reporting does not reflect the decline in juvenile crime). 
102. See Robert A. Stallings, Media Discourse and the Social Construction of Risk, 37
SOC. PROB. 80, 81–82 (1990) (studying interstate bridge collapse coverage and the role of 
experts in providing themes about risk and responsibility and finding one storyline on 
causality and blame regarding the collapse, and another representing the collapse as an 
example of a growing unsafe bridge problem). 
103. See William A. Gamson & Andre Modigliani, The Changing Culture of
Affirmative Action, in THE POLITICAL SOCIOLOGY OF THE STATE: ESSAYS ON THE ORIGINS, 
STRUCTURE, AND IMPACT OF THE MODERN STATE 289, 300–01, 304 (Richard G. Braungart 
& Margaret M. Braungart eds., 1990) (evaluating seven issue-packages regarding 
affirmative action coverage in television news, news magazines, editorial cartoons, and 
syndicated columns). 
104. See Gamson & Lasch, supra note 97, at 400–08 (using media coverage of welfare
to help establish “issue culture,” which in turn affects how lawmakers determine what 
they should do about the poor, and identifying “welfare freeloaders,” “working poor,” 
“poverty trap,” and “regulating the poor” issue packages in media and other materials). 
105. See Blasi, supra note 7, at 221 (studying articles on homelessness in five major
newspapers and finding that four percent “attributed individualistic causes to 
homelessness,” an extremely low percentage compared to poverty); Barrett A. Lee et al., 
Are the Homeless to Blame? A Test of Two Theories, 33 SOC. Q. 535, 537–38 (1992) 
[hereinafter Lee et al., Homeless to Blame?] (finding the media to be a valuable public 
arena to gauge public opinion and predict legislative developments on homelessness and 
finding that the majority of reporting mentioning any cause of homelessness identified 
structural determinants, such as a shrinking supply of low cost housing); see also Barrett 
A. Lee et al., Public Beliefs About the Causes of Homelessness, 69 SOC. FORCES 253, 253,
257 (1990) (finding that beliefs about “causes of homelessness emphasize structural forces
and bad luck over individualistic factors”).
106. See Iyengar, supra note 90, at 279 (“Participants were generally least apt to
hold individuals causally responsible and most apt to consider society responsible [for 
poverty] when the [television] news frame was societal.”). See generally Kevin B. Smith 
& Lorene H. Stone, Rags, Riches, and Bootstraps: Beliefs about Causes of Wealth and 
Poverty, 30 SOC. Q. 93, 93, 103 (1989) (noting that individualism has been widely accepted 
as the metatheory for explaining wealth and poverty but is not as universally accepted as 
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with a comparative perspective.107 These researchers are not 
trying to determine the nature of a particular problem, such as 
homelessness, although plenty of studies certainly focus on that 
type of question.108 Rather, they explore media portrayal of 
homelessness and its effects on perceptions of problems and 
support for solutions.109 These projects offer helpful explorations 
of media coverage even if one is ambivalent about social 
constructionism.110 They also offer important analytical tools to 
is often assumed). 
107. See Annette Benedict et al., Attitudes Toward the Homeless in Two New York
City Metropolitan Samples, J. VOLUNTARY ACTION RES., July-Dec. 1988, at 90, 91–92 
(evaluating perceptions of the homeless among suburbanites working in New York City 
and comparing perceptions of the elderly, welfare recipients, and the unemployed). See 
generally George Wilson, Toward a Revised Framework for Examining Beliefs About the 
Causes of Poverty, 37 SOC. Q. 413 (1996) (analyzing reports on welfare, homelessness, and 
migrant workers, finding that groups have not been uniformly framed, and concluding 
media messages alter individuals’ perceptions derived from personal experiences). See 
also Blasi, supra note 7, at 221 (noting the adage that “the media provide instruction to 
the public” and that public opinion “surveys determines [sic] how well the lessons have 
been learned”). Early agenda-setting studies relied to some extent on a comparative 
approach, ranking salience among several issues. For a review, see McCombs & Estrada, 
supra note 101, at 237–38. 
108. See, e.g., Marta Elliott & Lauren J. Krivo, Structural Determinants of
Homelessness in the United States, 38 SOC. PROBS. 113, 114 (1991) (describing two 
explanations: personal problems and structural conditions); Thomas J. Main, Analyzing 
Evidence for the Structural Theory of Homelessness, 18 J. URB. AFF. 449, 450, 456 (1996) 
(finding fault in structural theory, based on the high personal disability rate among the 
homeless). 
109. See, e.g., Lawrence Bobo, Social Responsibility, Individualism, and
Redistributive Policies, 6 SOC. FORUM 71, 72, 84–87 (1991) (concluding that individual 
responsibility theory dominates public opinion); Kay Young McChesney, Family 
Homelessness: A Systemic Problem, J. SOC. ISSUES, No. 4, at 191, 191, 200 (1990) (noting 
that perceptions of homelessness as a personal or family problem may lead people to 
conclude that the federal government need not be involved); see also GUSFIELD, supra note 
99, at 13 (“Public problems have a shape which is understood in a larger context of a 
social structure in which some versions of ‘reality’ have greater power and authority to 
define and describe that ‘reality’ than do others.”); ALAN IRWIN, RISK AND THE CONTROL OF 
TECHNOLOGY: PUBLIC POLICIES FOR ROAD TRAFFIC SAFETY IN BRITAIN AND THE UNITED 
STATES 28–29 (1986) (discussing problems associated with the public’s participation in 
technical decisionmaking); Best, supra note 101, at 327 (“Problems can always be depicted 
in more than one way: rape as sex crime or crime of violence; marijuana as a cause of 
psychosis, a precursor to hard drugs, or a threat to economic productivity . . . .”); Gray, 
supra note 101, at 47–48 (studying the limited media coverage of juvenile crime and 
arguing that media portrayal of crime and race leads to more punitive responses to 
juvenile problems). 
110. For explanations of social constructionism, see, e.g., Best, supra note 101, at 327
(“Explaining how and why particular images of problems emerge has become a central 
task for constructionist analysts.”); Theresa Glennon, Knocking Against the Rocks: 
Evaluating Institutional Practices and the African-American Boy, 5 J. HEALTH CARE L. 
& POL’Y 10, 36 (2002) (“The basic insight of social construction theory is that much of 
what we accept as fact is, rather, a culturally influenced interpretation of phenomena.”). 
For commentary on, and criticism of, social constructionism, see, e.g., IAN HACKING, THE 
SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF WHAT? 2–3 (1999) (noting that “social construction analyses do 
not always liberate,” can have the opposite effect—as in the case of anorexia—and 
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legal scholars interested in a broader conception of the 
determinants of legislative developments. 
The parties on whom reporters rely to shape and fill their 
stories deserve attention as well.111 Sources “are the deep, dark 
secret of the power of the press”; they might even lead the dance 
between reporters and themselves.112 They have a powerful 
opportunity to shape the way a problem or issue is understood.113 
Players readily become repeat players if they follow the rules.114 
generally only liberate “those who are on the way to being liberated”). See generally Steve 
Woolgar & Dorothy Pawluch, Ontological Gerrymandering: The Anatomy of Social Probs. 
Explanations, 32 SOC. PROBS. 214 (1985) (examining several examples of social problems 
to provide critical commentary on the social constructionist arguments used to explain 
them). 
111. See, e.g., RICHARD V. ERICSON ET AL., NEGOTIATING CONTROL: A STUDY OF NEWS 
SOURCES 3–4 (1989) (recognizing the power of a news source to shape the public’s 
perception of an event or issue in society); LEON V. SIGAL, REPORTERS AND OFFICIALS: THE 
ORGANIZATION AND POLITICS OF NEWSMAKING 123–25 (1973) (analyzing news source 
diversity); CAROL H. WEISS & ELEANOR SINGER, REPORTING OF SOCIAL SCIENCE IN THE 
NATIONAL MEDIA 175–79 (1988) (studying social science coverage and sourcing in national 
press and three weekly news magazines); Jane Delano Brown et al., Invisible Power: 
Newspaper News Sources and the Limits of Diversity, 64 JOURNALISM Q. 45, 47, 49, 53 
(1987) (studying front page stories and sourcing from national press and four North 
Carolina papers); Hugh M. Culbertson, Veiled News Sources—Who and What Are They? 
NEWS RES. BULL., May 1975, at 5, 5–6, 8–10, 13 (studying source attribution patterns in 
twelve newspapers); Daniel C. Hallin et al., Sourcing Patterns of National Security 
Reporters, 70 JOURNALISM Q. 753, 753–54 (1993); Jim Naureckas & Janine Jackson, 
Happily Ever NAFTA? Extra! Update, October 1993, in THE FAIR READER: AN EXTRA! 
REVIEW OF PRESS AND POLITICS IN THE ‘90S, at 149, 149–50 (Jim Naureckas & Janine 
Jackson eds., 1996) (reviewing sourcing in NAFTA stories, and observing pro-NAFTA bias 
among majority of sources, with scarce representation of environmentalists and trade 
unionists); Jim Naureckas & Janine Jackson, NAFTA’s Knee-Jerk Press, Extra! Update, 
January/February 1994, in THE FAIR READER, supra, at 151, 151 (discussing Sen. Byron 
Dorgan’s analysis of Washington Post editorials and op-eds on NAFTA, in which he found 
a pro-NAFTA bias of nearly seven to one). 
112. SCHUDSON, supra note 80, at 54, 134; see also John J. Oslund, The Media and
Government Regulation: Guarding the Hen House, 11 KAN. J.L. PUB. POL’Y 559, 561 
(2002) (arguing that the reporter-source relationship is “alternately symbiotic, 
confrontational, clandestine and political”). 
113. See, e.g., EDWARD S. HERMAN & NOAM CHOMSKY, MANUFACTURING CONSENT:
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE MASS MEDIA 18, 22 (1988) (noting that powerful 
bureaucracies acting as sources make information collection cheaper and easier for 
media); David Knoke & Edward O. Laumann, The Social Organization of National Policy 
Domains: An Exploration of Some Structural Hypotheses, in SOCIAL STRUCTURE AND 
NETWORK ANALYSIS 255, 259 (Peter V. Marsden & Nan Lin eds., 1982) (arguing that “the 
social structure of a national policy domain is primarily determined by the network of 
access to trustworthy and timely information about policy matters”); Stallings, supra note 
102, at 87 (asserting that the relationship between journalists and sources helps explain 
which causes get identified). 
114. See, e.g., SCHUDSON, supra note 80, at 52 (observing that journalists seek
experts that satisfy the press’s “operational bias” (citing Janet E. Steele, Experts and the 
Operational Bias of Television News: The Case of the Persian Gulf War, 72 JOURNALISM 
& MASS COMM. Q. 799 (1995))); WEISS & SINGER, supra note 111, at 45 (identifying that 
the “veterans of the press” effect leads to a finding that fifty-seven percent of those quoted 
in articles had been quoted “more than twenty times before”); WILLIS, supra note 10, at 
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The system rewards those who reach out to the media.115 
Speaking in quotable sentences and having a “flair for the 
dramatic” certainly help as well.116 Sources might be particularly 
influential in shaping stories about a legal system or issue if the 
details are relatively unfamiliar.117 Ultimately, the research 
suggests that sources many be able to play a role in legislative 
developments if they gain the trust of reporters and collaborate 
with them to help shape the media discourse.  
To gain insight on the role of the news media with respect to 
the omnibus bankruptcy legislation, I studied coverage of the bill 
in three high circulation and influential national newspapers: the 
Wall Street Journal, the New York Times, and the Washington 
Post.118 These papers are routinely chosen for analysis by a wide 
145 (describing reporters’ reliance on a small group of experts for stories, creating a 
rolodex effect); Brown et al., supra note 111, at 45–48 (arguing that reporters’ traditional 
sources satisfy two important criteria: availability and suitability). 
115. WEISS & SINGER, supra note 111, at 26–29, 46–48 (concluding that the majority
of reporters who write on social-science issues cite to or quote scientists who actively seek 
media coverage); see also SCHUDSON, supra note 80, at 135 (elucidating the college and 
university impetus to engage in outreach with media, particularly “when good things 
happen”); SIGAL, supra note 111, at 120–22 (finding that only one-fourth of the stories are 
derived of reporter’s own research initiative); Douglas L. Colbert, Broadening 
Scholarship: Embracing Law Reform and Justice, 52 J. LEGAL EDUC. 540, 556–57 (2002) 
(describing the dynamic between media reporters and a professor who was forthcoming 
with his research efforts); Al Kamen, In the Loop, WASH. POST, Apr. 3, 2001, at A19 
(reporting on Harvard Law School’s outreach to media to increase the citation of 
professors). 
116. WEISS & SINGER, supra note 111, at 47; see also Gamson & Lasch, supra note 97,
at 401 (describing the process by which symbolic actors and organizations influence their 
portrayal in the media and noting that “an apt metaphor or catchphrase will be picked up 
and amplified through the media—serving the interest of both sources and journalists”). 
For an evaluation of soundbiting, particularly with respect to television, see generally 
Daniel C. Hallin, Sound Bite News: Television Coverage of Elections, 1968–1988, 42 J. 
COMM. 5-24 (1992), reprinted in DO THE MEDIA GOVERN?, supra note 7, at 57. 
117. See generally MELVIN L. DEFLEUR & SANDRA BALL-ROKEACH, THEORIES OF
MASS COMMUNICATION (3d ed. 1975) (commenting that the relative importance of media 
discourse depends on readily available meaning-generating experiences in readers’ 
everyday lives); S.J. Ball-Rokeach & M.L. DeFleur, A Dependency Model of Mass-Media 
Effects, 3 COMM. RES. 3 (1976) (asserting that media’s often incomplete reporting 
immediately following unexpected events creates ambiguity in the audience and 
discussing media’s subsequent role in ambiguity resolution). 
118. See, e.g., Audit Bureau of Circulations, Top 150 Newspapers by Largest
Reported Circulation, at http://www.accessabc.com/reader/top100.htm (Nov. 12, 2004) 
(ranking the Wall Street Journal with the second highest circulation, the New York Times 
with the third, and the Washington Post with the fifth); Matthew Rose, Most Top 
Newspapers in U.S. Post Little Change in Circulation, WALL ST. J., Nov. 6, 2002, at B4 
(same). The New York Times claims to have the highest circulation of any seven day 
newspaper. N.Y. Times, The Best of Both Worlds, at http://www.nytadvertising.com/ 
was/circulation/pages/contentCirculation/0,1013,,00.html?l1Id=5 (last visited Nov. 12, 
2004) (citing Audit Bureau of Circulations Publisher’s Statement for six months ending 
March 31, 2004). The Wall Street Journal declares a circulation of over 2.1 million as of 
the six months ending March 31, 2004. Dow Jones & Co., The Wall Street Journal Global 
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range of researchers.119 Other media outlets and local newspapers 
would have enriched the analysis.120 These three national 
newspapers offer a good initial inquiry, however, given the 
growing uniformity of national news, the consolidation of media 
ownership, and the political power of these particular 
publications.121 I studied what I identified as the most relevant 
treatments of the omnibus bankruptcy bill in these three 
sources122 and focused on news and commentary between August 
Franchise, at http://www.dowjones.com/TheCompany/FactSheets.htm (last visited Nov. 
12, 2004) (citing Audit Bureau of Circulations Publisher’s Statement for six months 
ending March 31, 2004). 
119. See, e.g., BURSTEIN, supra note 94, at 202–03 (using New York Times articles as
reprinted in the New York Times Index); WEISS & SINGER, supra note 111, at 179 
(examining the New York Times, the Wall Street Journal, the Washington Post, and three 
newsweeklies); Brown et al., supra note 111, at 47 (performing content analysis on the 
New York Times and the Washington Post, among others); Lee et al., Homeless to Blame?, 
supra note 105, at 537–38 (1992) (studying the New York Times and the Washington Post 
coverage of homelessness); Russell, supra note 95, at 329 & n.6 (including the Wall Street 
Journal, the Washington Post, and the New York Times); Stallings, supra note 102, at 81 
(focusing on the New York Times); Wilson, supra note 107, at 415–16, 425 app. 1 
(analyzing the top five circulation newspapers); see also HERMAN & CHOMSKY, supra note 
113, at 132–37 & tbls. 3-1 to 3-3 (studying the New York Times reporting for systematic 
media bias); SIGAL, supra note 111, at 5–6 (singling out the New York Times and 
Washington Post for study). 
120. See, e.g., Best, supra note 101, at 328–29 (analyzing several national and local
papers as well as television news journals for freeway violence study); Brown et al., supra 
note 111, at 47 (using national sources and North Carolina papers for content analysis); J. 
William Spencer & Elizabeth Triche, Media Constructions of Risk and Safety: Differential 
Framings of Hazard Events, 64 SOC. INQUIRY, 199, 199–200 (1994) (studying a New 
Orleans newspaper for a comparative assessment of “local versus nonlocal consequences”). 
121. See Ben H. Bagdikian, The U.S. Media: Supermarket or Assembly Line?, in DO 
THE MEDIA GOVERN?, supra note 7, at 66, 68–70 (concluding that the consolidation of 
media outlets into relatively few hands has resulted in a homogenization of information 
that crowds out independent voices); see also JAMIESON & WALDMAN, supra note 7, at 96–
97 (arguing that the political impact of Sunday television talk shows is rivaled only by the 
New York Times and the Washington Post); SCHUDSON, supra note 80, at 121–22 
(describing the effects of corporate ownership newspapers’ uniform content); Who Owns 
What, Columbia Journalism Review, at http://www.cjr.org/tools/owners/ (last visited Nov. 
12, 2004) (providing links to information about major media holdings). 
122. Cf. Best, supra note 101, at 328–29 (examining “the most significant
treatments—both local and national—of the freeway violence problem” rather than 
collecting random sample); cf. see also Gross & Matheson, supra note 87, at 487–88 
(explaining that a set of newspaper articles are not representative or exhaustive, but are 
“interesting and suggestive”); Nourse & Schacter, supra note 30, at 580–81 (justifying a 
case study method rather than a large quantitative sample study for examining the 
legislative process). The term “bankruptcy” appears with incredible frequency, including 
references to specific cases or as a pejorative term (both in and out of newspapers). See, 
e.g., Laurence H. Tribe, The Unbearable Wrongness of Bush v. Gore, 19 CONST. COMMENT.
571, 573 (2002) (referring to the “embarrassing bankruptcy” of the Supreme Court’s
rationale in Bush v. Gore). A random sample of the more than 12,000 pieces mentioning
“bankruptcy” therefore would have been fruitless. Research assistants entered into a
spreadsheet basic information about these 12,000-plus items. The sample was narrowed
based on subject coding. A subsequent review by the Author of omitted pieces resulted in
the recharacterization of approximately fifty items. One item was added that is
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31, 1997 and August 31, 2001.123 From these news outlets, within 
this period, three striking frames emerged. 
IV. THREE PROMINENT EMERGING FRAMES OF BANKRUPTCY
A. A Campaign Finance Story: Industry Power, Money, and
Predation
As in earlier pieces noted in the beginning of Part II, certain
quoted sources, such as industry representatives and other bill 
proponents, sought to frame discussions of bankruptcy in terms 
of debtor irresponsibility124 and declining bankruptcy stigma.125 
The bankruptcy bill, they asserted, simply fixes the flaw in the 
current system that encourages irresponsibility,126 but will not 
inexplicably missing from the Lexis archive of New York Times pieces.  
123. The start date slightly precedes the introduction of the initial bankruptcy bills
in the 105th Congress, and the end date was chosen at a time when it seemed virtually 
certain the bill would have passed. 
124. See, e.g., Kathleen Day, Senate Votes to Toughen Bankruptcy: 36 Democrats
Support Measure Backed by Bush, WASH. POST, Mar. 16, 2001, at A1 [hereinafter Day, 
Senate Votes to Toughen Bankruptcy] (“Wealthier filers walk away from billions of dollars 
in debt each year, regardless of their ability to pay . . . .”); Eric Schmitt, Senate Approves a 
Bill to Toughen Bankruptcy Rules: Higher Bar for Debtors, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3, 2000, at A1 
[hereinafter Schmitt, Higher Bar for Debtors] (“‘Despite their ability to pay, wealthier 
filers walk away from an estimated $3 billion per year in debt.’” (quoting Edward L. 
Yingling)); Seelye, Republicans Agree to New Limits, supra note 47 (referring to “abusive 
spending practices of those who exploit the Federal bankruptcy code for personal gain or 
convenience” (quoting Sen. Charles E. Grassley)); Philip Shenon, How Bill in Senate 
Would Add Hurdles to Erasing of Debt, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 14, 2001, at A1 [hereinafter 
Shenon, Bill Would Add Hurdles to Erasing of Debt] (referring to “‘the unscrupulous who 
abuse our system’” (quoting Sen. Orrin Hatch)); Philip Shenon, Senate Rejects Industry 
Curbs on Bankruptcy, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8, 2001, at A18 [hereinafter Shenon, Senate 
Rejects Industry Curbs] (“Unnecessary and abusive bankruptcy costs everyone.” (quoting 
Sen. Joseph Biden Jr.)). 
125. See, e.g., Steve France, Editorial, Big Brother Bankruptcy, WASH. POST, Mar. 21,
2000, at A25 (citing Sen. Hatch’s floor statements lamenting the declining stigma); Robert 
D. Hershey Jr., Creditors Lead Push to Curb Bankruptcy, N.Y. TIMES, May 10, 1998, at
BU10 (“‘The only reasonable explanation [for the increase in bankruptcy filings] is that
the stigma of bankruptcy is all but dead . . . .’” (quoting Rep. Gekas)); Peter Pae &
Stephanie Stoughton, Personal Bankruptcy Filings Hit Record: Easy Credit Blamed,
Congress May Act, WASH. POST, June 7, 1998, at A1 (“[N]ow [bankruptcy is] no big deal.
It’s a way of doing business. I can’t completely explain why the stigma is gone, but it’s
gone.’” (quoting Rep. Bill McCollum)); Katharine Q. Seelye, Panel to Vote on Measure to
Tighten Bankruptcy Law, N.Y. TIMES, May 14, 1998, at A22 [hereinafter Seelye, Vote on
Measure to Tighten Bankruptcy] (citing Rep. Gekas as arguing that the stigma of filing
bankruptcy has all but vanished).
126. Sources characterized current law as a “free ride” or an “easy out” fraught with
“loopholes” that lets “big spenders walk away from their debts” and was “as convenient as 
going into a 7-Eleven.” Kathleen Day, Bankruptcy Bill Goes to House Floor, WASH. POST, 
May 5, 1999, at E1 [hereinafter Day, Bankruptcy Bill Goes to House Floor] (characterizing 
bankruptcy bill as “‘clos[ing] the loopholes’” used by the wealthy to get out of debt 
(quoting Sen. Grassley)); Kathleen Day, House Passes Tougher Debt Rules: Clinton 
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affect access for legitimate users.127 Unlike in some of the earlier 
stories, however, the sentiments did not shape the reporting. To 
the contrary, some journalists covered the omnibus bankruptcy 
bill as a story of industry influence.128 For example, in a front 
page Wall Street Journal story in June 1998, Card Games: As 
Bankruptcies Surge, Creditors Lobby Hard to Get Tougher Laws, 
reporter Jacob Schlesinger attributed the likely success of the 
bankruptcy bill to a “multimillion-dollar public-relations and 
lobbying blitz run largely by companies with the most to gain.”129 
Opposes Bankruptcy Bill, WASH. POST, Oct. 13, 2000, at E3 [hereinafter Day, House 
Passes Tougher Debt Rules] (claiming the bill “‘strikes the balance needed to strengthen 
the safety net for people who need a fresh start after a hardship while closing the 
loopholes exploited by big spenders’” (quoting Sen. Grassley)); Dawn Kopecki, Law Would 
Require Credit Counseling: Bankruptcy Filers Would Face Two Rounds of Classes, WALL 
ST. J., Apr. 16, 2001, at B3F (claiming bankruptcy is thought of as an “‘easy out’” (quoting 
Sen. Grassley)); Caroline E. Mayer, Bankruptcy Bill Passed by Senate: Wiping Out Debts 
Would Be Harder, WASH. POST, Sept. 24, 1998, at E1 [hereinafter Mayer, Bankruptcy Bill 
Passed by Senate] (quoting Sen. Grassley); Mayer, Negotiators Complete Bankruptcy 
Reform Bill, supra note 47 (“The measure ‘sends a clear signal for those who have abused 
the bankruptcy code that the free ride is over.’” (quoting Sen. Grassley)); Schlesinger, As 
Bankruptcies Surge, supra note 3 (quoting Sen. Grassley); Schmitt, Higher Bar for 
Debtors, supra note 124 (“‘It was time for Congress to close the loopholes that let big 
spenders walk away from debts . . . .’” (quoting Sen. Grassley)); id. (“[The] bill closes 
loopholes and ends unfairness in provisions that are totally being abused and making a 
mockery out of legitimate bankruptcy.” (quoting Sen. Sessions)); Katharine Q. Seelye, 
House Approves Legislation to Curb Laws on Bankruptcy, N.Y. TIMES, June 11, 1998, at 
A22 (“Filing for bankruptcy ‘shouldn’t be as convenient as going into a 7-Eleven.’” 
(quoting Rep. Tim J. Roemer)); Katharine Q. Seelye, Senate Votes to Curb Bankruptcy 
Abuse by Consumers, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 24, 1998, at A25 [hereinafter Seelye, Senate to 
Curb Bankruptcy Abuse] (quoting Sen. Grassley). 
127. Katherine Ackley & Jacob M. Schlesinger, House Panel Approves Bankruptcy-
Reform Bill, WALL ST. J., Apr. 29, 1999, at B16 (“‘This legislation simply requires that 
individuals filing for bankruptcy who are capable of repaying even a portion of their debts 
do so . . . .’” (quoting Rep. Gekas)); Tom Hamburger, House Legislators Pass Measure to 
Curb Abuse of Bankruptcy-Protection Laws, WALL ST. J., Mar. 2, 2001, at B2 [hereinafter 
Hamburger, House Measure to Curb Abuse] (reporting that Joe Rubin, a former Gekas 
staffer now with the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, “told wavering House members that 
‘this bill is targeted solely at wealthy debtors who have abused the bankruptcy system 
and can afford to repay their debts’”); Labaton, Promised Veto, supra note 60 (“‘We 
guarantee a fresh start to any American who needs it . . . .’” (quoting Rep. Gekas)); Jacob 
M. Schlesinger, House Approves Bankruptcy Overhaul amid Criticism Bill May Be Too
Tough, WALL ST. J., May 6, 1999, at A28 (“The risk of squeezing the truly needy . . . ‘is
very minimal.’” (quoting Rep. Gekas)).
128. As early as January 1998, political reporter Bill McAllister, who admittedly
focuses on lobbying for the Washington Post, reported that “a powerful coalition of credit 
card and financial companies is promising to make the seemingly arcane intricacies of 
bankruptcy law one of the most heavily lobbied issues of 1998.” Bill McAllister, Reopening 
Chapter 7, WASH. POST, Jan. 1, 1998, at A23 (discussing lobbyists, public relations firms, 
and heavy hitters and describing the power of the American Financial Services 
Association, whose representative “promise[d] lots of ‘old-fashioned lobbying,’” which 
McAllister translated into “financial CEOs buttonholing lawmakers and urging them to 
put the screws to” bankruptcy filers). 
129. Schlesinger, As Bankruptcies Surge, supra note 3 (explaining how consumer
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The industry influence frame thrust campaign contribution 
and credit-card lending statistics to the forefront even though 
they are not technically bankruptcy issues.130 Reporters 
questioned the existence of a connection between candidate or 
party fundraising and bankruptcy bill support.131 They observed 
that “the campaign contributions and lobbying muscle come 
lending coalition helped “nuke” the Bankruptcy Commission’s report, drafted parts of the 
House Bill, funded and widely advertised research justifying reform, underwrote opinion 
polls to show public support for reform, retained expert lobbyists, increased campaign 
contributions for legislators, and tried to pressure another group into taking a less 
negative stance toward the legislation). Around the same time, Robert Cwyklik of the 
Wall Street Journal wrote an in-depth story on industry-funded research, with special 
focus on a credit-industry-funded academic center that produced studies supporting the 
industry’s bankruptcy reform requests. Robert Cwiklik, Ivory Tower Inc.: When Research 
and Lobbying Mesh, WALL ST. J., June 9, 1998, at B1. 
130. See, e.g., Kathleen Day, Foes of Bankruptcy Bill Point Finger at Credit Card
Issuers, WASH. POST, Feb. 28, 2001, at E1 [hereinafter Day, Foes of Bankruptcy Bill] 
(reporting that a nonprofit consumer group issued a “report showing that in addition to 
shipping an estimated 3.3 billion mail offers [for credit-cards] last year,” the industry also 
“expanded available credit beyond consumer demand”); Day, House Passes Bankruptcy 
Limits, supra note 4 (reporting that total federal campaign contributions for the 2000 
election year almost doubled from those in 1996); Day, House Passes Tougher Debt Rules, 
supra note 126 (reporting on the $6 million in campaign contributions made by retailers, 
banks, and credit-card companies in the first six months of 2000); Day, Senate Votes to 
Toughen Bankruptcy, supra note 124 (reporting similar figures); Mayer, Bankruptcy Bill 
Passed By Senate, supra note 126 (reporting similar contributions); Peter Pae, House 
Rewrites Bankruptcy Laws: Measure Would Restrict Personal Filings, WASH. POST, June 
11, 1998, at A1 (reporting that “banks, consumer finance companies and credit card 
issuers made about $6.7 million in campaign contributions in the past year”); Seelye, 
Senate to Curb Bankruptcy Abuse, supra note 126 (reporting on credit-card profitability 
and the potential profits from the bill’s passage). 
131. See, e.g., Tom Hamburger et al., Influence Market: Industries that Backed Bush
Are Now Seeking Return on Investment, WALL ST. J., Mar. 6, 2001, at A1 (analyzing 
whether the credit industry expected and would receive payback from the Bush 
Administration by the Administration’s support of the bankruptcy bill); John D. 
McKinnon, Senate Hopeful in Florida Banks on His Role in Bankruptcy Bill, WALL ST. J., 
Sept. 26, 2000, at A28 (considering Rep. McCollum’s reliance on credit industry funds for 
Senate campaign financing and his leading role with the bankruptcy bill); Dan Morgan & 
Kathleen Day, Early Wins Embolden Lobbyists for Business: Groups to Push Much 
Broader Agenda, WASH. POST, Mar. 11, 2001, at A1 (claiming that business lobbyists are 
hoping to “cash[] in” on a favorable business climate created by the Bush Administration); 
Jacob M. Schlesinger, Bush to Support Bankruptcy Bill that Clinton Vetoed Last Year, 
WALL ST. J., Feb. 6, 2001, at A4 (“President Bush will soon give an important boost to the 
credit-card industry and other lenders, endorsing their efforts to tighten bankruptcy laws 
that were blocked by former President Clinton.”); Susan Schmidt, Torricelli’s Money Push 
Also Raises Some Hackles: Business Fills Senate Democratic Coffers, WASH. POST, June 
17, 2000, at A1 (questioning whether Sen. Torricelli supported the bill because he was 
“courting” industry for party fundraising); Philip Shenon, Hard Lobbying on Debtor Bill 
Pays Dividend, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 13, 2001, at A1 [hereinafter Shenon, Hard Lobbying 
Pays Dividend] (“[L]obbying campaign led by credit card companies and banks that gave 
millions of dollars in political donations to members of Congress and contributed 
generously to President Bush’s 2000 campaign is close to its long-sought goal of 
overhauling the nation’s bankruptcy system.”). 
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mainly from the politically powerful financial community.”132 
They were quick to note that the bill’s movement “underscores 
the new influence business has in Washington,”133 and constitutes 
“a huge success for banks, credit-card companies and retailers,”134 
who “boast some of the best-connected lobbyists on Capitol 
Hill.”135 
Even stories with a broader focus used language suggesting 
credit industry power and sometimes even aggression. The 
legislation was “vigorously sought,”136 “championed,”137 and 
“pushed”138 by the credit industry. The credit industry 
“swarmed,”139 “fanned out across Capitol Hill,”140 and “lobbied 
hard”141 through a “multimillion-dollar lobbying, research and 
advertising campaign”142 “to ensure . . . it would be first in line to 
132. Schmitt, Higher Bar for Debtors, supra note 124.
133. Day, Senate Votes to Toughen Bankruptcy, supra note 124.
134. Seelye, Republicans Agree to New Limits, supra note 47; see also Pae &
Stoughton, supra note 125 (describing the push for bankruptcy reform by creditors). 
135. Philip Shenon, Senate Democrats Stall Bankruptcy Bill, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17,
2001, at A11 [hereinafter Shenon, Senate Democrats]. 
136. Mayer, Bankruptcy Bill Passed by Senate, supra note 126; Mayer, Negotiators
Complete Bankruptcy Reform Bill, supra note 47; Helen Dewar & Kathleen Day, Senate 
Approves Bankruptcy Bill: Industry-Sought Overhaul Passes 83–14, WASH. POST, Feb. 3, 
2000, at A1 (stating that bankruptcy overhaul “was sought by the credit card industry” to 
control escalating filings). 
137. Philip Shenon, Bankruptcy Measure Gains on a Lopsided Senate Vote By 80–19,
Chamber Acts to Cut Off Debate, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15, 2001, at A22 [hereinafter Shenon, 
Measure Gains on a Lopsided Senate Vote]; Shenon, Bill Would Add Hurdles to Erasing of 
Debt, supra note 124 (claiming bill is being championed by the credit industry as a cure-
all for their problems that are due to the increase in bankruptcy filings); Shenon, Senate 
Democrats, supra note 135. 
138. Bankruptcy-Reform Bill Dies with a “Pocket Veto”, WALL ST. J., Dec. 20, 2000, at
1; Day, House Passes Bankruptcy Limits, supra note 4; Hamburger, House Measure to 
Curb Abuse, supra note 127 (stating that businesses have “pushed” for bankruptcy system 
overhaul for three years); Eric Schmitt, Senators Back Major Overhaul of Bankruptcy, 
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8, 2000, at A1 (reporting on lobbyists who were promising a “furious” 
campaign to override the potential veto). 
139. Katharine Q. Seelye, House to Vote Today on Legislation for Bankruptcy
Overhaul, N.Y. TIMES, June 10, 1998, at A18 [hereinafter Seelye, House to Vote on 
Bankruptcy Overhaul] (“[S]cores of lawyers and industry lobbyists swarmed over the 
House and Senate Judiciary Committees as they gaveled the bankruptcy bill to 
approval.”). 
140. Philip Shenon, Bill to Tighten Bankruptcy Gets a Push: Democratic Senate
Helps Break a Logjam, N.Y. TIMES, June 12, 2001, at C1 [hereinafter Shenon, Bill to 
Tighten Bankruptcy Gets a Push]. 
141. Kathleen Day, Bankruptcy Bill Put on Fast Track: Republicans Say Law Would
Curb Abuses, WASH. POST, Feb. 8, 2001, at E1; Day, Senate Votes to Toughen Bankruptcy, 
supra note 124. 
142. Jacob M. Schlesinger, Senate Approves Overhaul of Bankruptcy Code, WALL ST. 
J., Sept. 24, 1998, at A2; see also Ackley & Schlesinger, supra note 127 (stating that 
“credit-card companies and other lenders have lobbied hard over the past two years to 
toughen the Bankruptcy Code,” and reporting that even Rep. Henry Hyde found the 
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collect from bankruptcy filers,”143 and to “recoup billions of 
dollars.”144 Dan Morgan of the Washington Post described creditor 
representatives who “patrolled” outside of key House votes and 
engaged in “behind-the-scenes-maneuvering.”145 A photograph 
accompanying one New York Times article had little to do with 
bankruptcy and everything to do with lobbying power: the 
picture featured a grouping of lobbyists who “can regularly be 
found in the Senate Reception Room, just off the Senate chamber, 
and there was no exception yesterday as the bankruptcy 
overhaul legislation long championed by the banking and credit-
card industries moved toward final passage.”146 Stories of creditor 
infighting and internal fractures to the coalition also emerged,147 
notwithstanding the credit industry’s general assertion of a 
unified position and interest in bankruptcy.148 
credit-industry supported legislation heavy handed); Schroeder & Schlesinger, supra note 
4 (“[C]redit-card companies spent heavily on lobbying, advertising, and research over the 
past year to promote the most sweeping overhaul of the federal bankruptcy code in 20 
years.”). 
143. Pae, supra note 130; see also Peter Pae & Stephanie Stoughton, Senate’s 
Bankruptcy Bill Gains Support: Vote Could Come in July, WASH. POST, June 12, 1998, at 
F3 (positing that creditors are seeking “greater powers to recoup what they are owed”). 
144. Seelye, Senate to Curb Bankruptcy Abuse, supra note 126; see also Kathleen
Day, Bankruptcy Legislation Still Faces Hurdles, WASH. POST, May 5, 2000, at E2 
[hereinafter Day, Bankruptcy Legislation Still Faces Hurdles] (“[A]fter three years of 
trying—and spending more than $23.4 million in contributions . . . industry groups were 
closer than ever to getting the bankruptcy bill they wanted enacted.”). 
145. Morgan, Creditors’ Money, supra note 37 (noting the “wide spectrum of special
interests” backing the bill and saying the House Bill is “salted with language benefiting” a 
variety of creditor types who have also lobbied heavily); see also Morgan & Day, supra 
note 131 (claiming lawmakers “consulted closely with representatives” of key lobbyists 
and creditor representatives). 
146. Shenon, Measure Gains on a Lopsided Senate Vote, supra note 137.
147. Yochi J. Dreazen, Bankruptcy Reform Pits Industries Against Each Other, WALL 
ST. J., Apr. 20, 2000, at A28 (“[I]n the back rooms of Capitol Hill, the nature of the fight 
changes. Industry lobbyists, many ostensibly allied in favor of bankruptcy-overhaul 
legislation, vie to carve out as many favors for their clients as possible at the expense of 
other business groups.”). 
148. Hamburger, Auto Firms See Profit in Bankruptcy-Reform, supra note 3
(claiming that the “long-sought bill . . . contains several other obscure provisions 
that . . . provide special benefits to groups with the ability to influence decision makers”). 
Cf. Mike McEneney, Remarks at the Meeting of the National Bankruptcy Review 
Commission 202 (Dec. 17, 1996) (transcript on file with the Houston Law Review) (“We’ve 
tried to convey that we are a unified industry. We’re trying to speak with one voice. We 
find it to be a harmonious one, not a cacophony, for example, and if you hear any discord, 
please let us know.”). But see Dreazen, supra note 147 (claiming that the facially unified 
creditor’s lobby becomes increasingly fragmented behind the scenes); David Wessel, The 
Muddled Course of Bankruptcy Law, WALL ST. J., Feb. 22, 2001, at A1 (explaining that 
bankruptcy at its “loftiest level” is about balancing debtors’ fresh starts with creditor 
fairness, but “at ground level, it’s about consumer lenders—car dealers, credit-card 
issuers, furniture stores—jockeying for position to get what they can from families with 
little money left”). See generally Posner, supra note 45, at 55–56 (explaining potential 
conflicts among creditors in the creation of the 1978 Act). 
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The quotes of sources opposed to the bill or critical of 
portions of it often focused on the credit industry rather than 
substantive bankruptcy issues.149 Critics called the bill the “‘best 
bill money can buy,’” the “‘industry’s wish list,’”150 “‘of, by and for 
the credit companies,’”151 and “‘written by a lot of people who have 
very special interests to protect.’”152 They described the credit 
industry as “big givers, heavy hitters, a huge and powerful 
lobbying coalition”153 that wrote “large parts of the bill, paid for 
questionable research to support their claims, hired some of the 
best lobbyists in town and liberally stuffed the campaign coffers 
of key members of both parties.”154 Skeptics and opponents 
149. See, e.g., Dreazen, supra note 147 (“‘This whole bill is a case of one industry
picking the pockets of another.’” (quoting Professor Warren)); Katharine Q. Seelye, 
D’Amato Proposes Cut in Some Fees Charged to A.T.M. Users, N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 1998, 
at A17 (“‘If you vote against it, you lose campaign contributions from the banks . . . . But if 
you vote for it, you let your opponent point out to voters that you just socked it to 
consumers.’” (quoting Professor Warren)); Seelye, House to Vote on Bankruptcy Overhaul, 
supra note 139 (estimating that creditors “‘could easily see a billion a year in windfall 
profits from this legislation . . . by squeezing hard-pressed families out of the bankruptcy 
system and continuing to collect from them $50 here and $50 there’” (quoting Professor 
Warren)); Seelye, Senate to Curb Bankruptcy Abuse, supra note 126 (“‘How can 
democratically elected representatives vote to transfer wealth from financially troubled 
families to corporate lenders who are making record profits?’” (quoting Professor 
Warren)); Shenon, Hard Lobbying Pays Dividend, supra note 131 (“‘This bill is the credit 
card industry’s wish list . . . . They’ve hired every lobbying firm in Washington. They’ve 
decided that it’s time to lock the doors to the bankruptcy courthouse.’” (quoting Professor 
Warren)). 
150. Day, Bankruptcy Bill Goes to House Floor, supra note 126 (quoting Frank
Torres, a lobbyist for Consumers Union); Morgan & Day, supra note 131 (quoting Torres). 
151. Jacob M. Schlesinger & Christina Duff, House Approves Big Bankruptcy-Code
Overhaul, WALL ST. J., June 11, 1998, at A2 (quoting Rep. Jerrold Nadler); Katharine Q. 
Seelye, House Approves Legislation to Curb Laws on Bankruptcy, N.Y. TIMES, June 11, 
1998, at A22 (interviewing Rep. Nadler, who emphasized the creditors’ central focus of 
increasing debt recovery). 
152. Schlesinger, As Bankruptcies Surge, supra note 3 (quoting Sen. Dick Durbin).
Although Sen. Durbin was an original sponsor of the Senate Bill, he sought to achieve a 
balanced product and thus was critical of versions of the bill that restricted bankruptcy 
relief as proposed by the credit industry without also addressing credit industry practices. 
See e.g., Mayer, Negotiators Complete Bankruptcy Reform Bill, supra note 47 (indicating 
that Sen. Durbin was “disturbed” by the Republican version of the bill that eliminated a 
requirement for credit-card companies to provide a form of credit counseling to 
consumers); Morgan, Creditors’ Money, supra note 37 (describing Sen. Durbin’s version of 
the bill as “more friendly to borrowers”). 
153. Shenon, Measure Gains on a Lopsided Senate Vote, supra note 137 (“[Industry
representatives] have way too much access, and they have way too much say. And I say 
that this is an institutional problem, because the people who are trying to rebuild their 
lives in bankruptcy, they don’t have clout, the same economic resources.” (quoting Sen. 
Paul Wellstone)); see also Seelye, Senate to Curb Bankruptcy Abuse, supra note 126 
(noting the overwhelming support for the bill in the Senate). 
154. Morgan & Day, supra note 131 (quoting Travis Plunkett of the Consumer
Federation of America); see also Kathleen Day, Credit Counseling Agencies Dealt Setback: 
Banks Reduce Funding as Bankruptcies Rise; Consumer Groups Hit Move, WASH. POST, 
2004] NEGOTIATING BANKRUPTCY LEGISLATION 1123 
described credit industry lobbying as “brazen,” particularly when 
“their aggressive marketing and lending practices” push families 
into financial trouble.155 
Aside from the news reporting, the New York Times and 
Washington Post editorial pages also strongly embraced this 
industry power frame.156 They described the bill as “stuffed with 
gifts to the credit card industry, which has gained leverage in 
Congress through millions of dollars in campaign 
contributions.”157 They found the support of both Republicans and 
Democrats being lobbied, bought,158 and “generously paid” for: on 
July 16, 1999, at E1 (quoting Plunkett as saying that the “‘credit card industry has spent 
millions of dollars to scapegoat many working Americans’”); Day, House Passes 
Bankruptcy Limits, supra note 4 (“‘This one-sided bill demonstrates the power of political 
money over balanced public policy.’” (quoting Ed Mierzwinski of the U.S. Public Interest 
Research group)); Day, Senate Votes to Toughen Bankruptcy, supra note 124 (“‘The cries, 
claims and concerns of vulnerable Americans who have suffered a financial emergency 
have been drowned out by the political might of the credit card industry.’” (quoting 
Howard M. Metzenbaum, head of Consumer Federation of America); Id. (quoting Sen. 
Patrick Leahy as saying the industry got “‘a heck of windfall and a lot more than they 
deserve’”); Labaton, Promised Veto, supra note 60 (quoting John J. Sweeny, president of 
AFL-CIO, as saying the “‘bill is a heartless attack on working families by powerful 
financial institutions’”); Seelye, First Lady in a Messy Fight, supra note 4 (“‘It was a 
combination of aggressive industry lobbying, by retailers as well as creditors, and they 
spent a great deal . . . .’” (quoting Stephen Brobeck, executive director of Consumer 
Federation of America)); Seelye, House to Vote on Bankruptcy Overhaul, supra note 139 
(“‘It’s hard to find someone on K Street who hasn’t been called in to work on this bill.’” 
(quoting Sen. Christopher Dodd)); Shenon, Hard Lobbying Pays Dividend, supra note 131 
(reporting Sen. Leahy’s comment on credit industry influence over lawmakers’ support for 
bill); Shenon, Senate Rejects Industry Curbs, supra note 124 (quoting Sen. Russell 
Feingold accusing the credit industry of “‘shower[ing] senators and the political parties, 
and it shows’”). 
155. Day, Foes of Bankruptcy Bill, supra note 130 (quoting Travis Plunkett); Philip
Shenon, Senate Panel Approves Bill for Overhauling Bankruptcy Laws, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 
1, 2001, at A15 (same); see also Associated Press, Legislation to Overhaul Laws on 
Bankruptcy Dies as President Fails to Sign It, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 20, 2000, at A32 
(reporting on Sen. Edward Kennedy’s views that the veto was appropriate and that the 
bankruptcy bill was too harsh on innocent debtors); Associated Press, Resisting Credit 
Cards’ Allure, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 2000, at BU11 (stating that consumer advocates 
attribute a decline in filings to changes in lending and borrowing practices); Schmitt, 
Higher Bar for Debtors, supra note 124 (referring to bill as “‘industry’s cure’” that was 
“‘worse than the disease’” (quoting Sen. Kennedy)); Wessel, supra note 148 (emphasizing 
industry practices by citing unnamed consumer advocates claiming that “creditors are too 
quick to lend”). See generally SKEEL, JR., supra note 1, at 203 (noting that some debtor 
advocates blamed lenders for bankruptcy boom). 
156. The Wall Street Journal editorial board did not directly address bankruptcy
reform during the period of study. 
157. Editorial, A Gift for the Credit Card Industry, N.Y. TIMES, May 30, 2000, at A22.
158. Editorial, A Business-Dictated Bankruptcy Law, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 16, 2001, at
A18 (classifying the bill as a reward for industry generosity to Republican candidates and 
noting that “now credit card issuers want the government to reduce all risk from their 
profitable business”); Editorial, A Retreat in the Senate, WASH. POST, Jan. 27, 2000, at 
A26 (“The lending industry badly wants the bankruptcy bill. That’s the pressure to which 
the Senate Democrats are yielding.”); Editorial, Bankrupt Bipartisanship, WASH. POST, 
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account of “a modest investment—perhaps $20 million in 
political contributions and another $5 million or so to grease the 
palms of lobbyists—banks, credit-card companies and other 
lenders are hoping for legislation that may squeeze $3 billion 
extra from bankrupt debtors every year.”159 Authors of signed 
opinion pieces, including David Broder, Floyd Norris, and Sen. 
Russ Feingold, also framed discussions of bankruptcy in terms of 
industry influence.160 
Anecdotal observation suggests parallels in other media 
outlets.161 For example, Time magazine ran a major article, 
Dec. 15, 2000, at A40 [hereinafter Bankrupt Bipartisanship] (encouraging Senators to 
back possible Clinton veto “however generous the contributions from the credit-card 
industry”); Editorial, Loophole for Millionaires, WASH. POST, July 16, 2001, at A14 
[hereinafter Loophole for Millionaires] (questioning whether conference committee could 
make meaningful progress given Senators Daschle and Biden’s support for credit 
industry); Editorial, Reform Choice for Mr. Bush, WASH. POST, Feb. 19, 2001, at A32 
(predicting industry would remind lawmakers about contributions when they scrutinized 
the bill). 
159. Editorial, The Rich Win, WASH. POST, June 9, 2000, at A32.
160. David S. Broder, Business in the Driver’s Seat, WASH. POST, Mar. 14, 2001, at
A25 (“Banks and credit card companies have been pressing for the bankruptcy law 
changes for five years, eager to stem their losses from people who accept the ‘easy credit’ 
these same companies market with 3 billion solicitations a year . . . .”); David S. Broder, 
Morally Bankrupt Creditors, WASH. POST, May 16, 1999, at B7 (“[T]he banks that 
dominate that business have been the most aggressive lobbyists for tightening the 
bankruptcy law.”); Russ Feingold, Lobbyists’ Rush for Bankruptcy Reform, WASH. POST, 
June 7, 1999, at A19 (characterizing bankruptcy legislation as the poster child for 
campaign finance reform). 
Powerful economic interests see an opportunity to push through major structural 
changes to the bankruptcy system before the public becomes aware of the 
consequences of what they are doing and works to stop them. And one reason 
these interests can get Congress to act so quickly is that they have spent 
millions on lobbying and campaign contributions. 
Id.; Floyd Norris, Editorial, Bankruptcy Reform that Spares the Wealthy, N.Y. TIMES, May 
9, 1999, at A16 [hereinafter Norris, Bankruptcy Reform that Spares the Wealthy] 
(asserting that the “bill was pushed by the credit card companies”). 
161. See Deeper in Debt, ECONOMIST, July 3, 1999, at 64, 64 (arguing that
profitability of risky lending “has not stopped the credit-card industry from lobbying 
furiously” for bankruptcy reform and questioning if “anybody [can] stop the credit-card 
companies [from] changing the rules after the game has [already] started”); Michele 
Jacklin, Editorial, U.S. House Gives a Boost to Credit-Card Sharks, Editorial, HARTFORD 
COURANT, June 23, 1999, at A15 (highlighting the favorable concessions that credit-card 
companies would gain with the bill and the amount that the credit industry has 
contributed to political campaigns); Christopher H. Schmitt, Tougher Bankruptcy Laws—
Compliments of MBNA?, BUS. WEEK, Feb. 26, 2001, at 43, 43 (describing MNBA’s efforts 
to influence the Republican lawmakers); Paul Wiseman, Lenders Lobby for Reform of 
Bankruptcy, USA TODAY, Oct. 21, 1997, at 6A; Joshua Wolf Shenk, Bankrupt Policy, THE 
NEW REPUBLIC, May 18, 1998, at 16, 16–17 (examining credit industry profitability and 
lobbying efforts); Robert Reno, Feeding Sharks, Starving Minnows, NEWSDAY, Sept. 27, 
1998 (commenting that “rarely does the U.S. Senate disgrace itself with such perfect 
symmetry,” suggesting that lenders’ success with bankruptcy reform was accomplished by 
“pour[ing] $17 million into the last congressional elections,” and asserting that lenders 
“are getting full value for their money”). 
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Soaked by Congress: Lavished with Campaign Cash, Lawmakers 
Are “Reforming” Bankruptcy—Punishing the Downtrodden to 
Catch a Few Cheats,162 which was rumored to have affected the 
political future of bankruptcy during the Clinton 
Administration.163 
1. Controversy? The industry influence frame was perhaps
the most ubiquitous and the least effective of those explored in 
this Article. Framing the bankruptcy debate in terms of credit 
industry power arguably enabled a broader group of people, 
including consumer advocates and some lawmakers, to speak 
critically about the bill without deep expertise in bankruptcy.164 It 
also was an integral part of an attempt to make the omnibus 
bankruptcy bill a “poster child” for campaign finance reform.165 
There is, however, little evidence that lawmakers embraced this 
link in large numbers.166 Given the ubiquity of special interests in 
federal lawmaking, the fact of credit industry support hardly 
could itself be a substantial roadblock to legislation.167 
162. Donald L. Barlett & James B. Steele, Soaked by Congress: Lavished with
Campaign Cash, Lawmakers Are “Reforming” Bankruptcy—Punishing the Downtrodden 
to Catch a Few Cheats, TIME, May 15, 2000, at 64; Charles Jordan Tabb, The Death of 
Consumer Bankruptcy in the United States?, 18 BANKR. DEV. J. 1, 47–48 (2001) (noting 
this type of general press coverage, including prominent Time magazine article). 
163. Interview with Brady Williamson (Oct. 24, 2002) (reporting that Sen. Ted
Kennedy hand-delivered “Soaked by Congress” to President Clinton). 
164. Refer to notes 150–55 supra and accompanying text.
165. Editorial, A Bankrupt Proposal, S.F. CHRON., July 25, 2001, at A18 (describing
the bankruptcy bill as a “special-interest bonanza” helping to justify campaign finance 
reform); Feingold, supra note 160 (citing bankruptcy legislation as the poster child for 
campaign finance reform). But see William F. Buckley, Jr., Buy Now, Pay Never: What 
About the Excesses of the Appetites of the Borrower?, at http://www.nationalreview.com/ 
buckley/buckleyprint031301.html (Mar. 13, 2001) (criticizing media focus on lobbying and 
contributions); National Review Staff, Journalistically Bankrupt: How Else to Describe 
One Network’s Coverage of New Bankruptcy Legislation?, at http://www.nationalreview. 
com/nr_comment/nr_commentprint031601c.html (Mar. 16, 2001) (criticizing reporters for 
focusing on lobbying and contributions rather than substantive merits of legislation); 
Todd J. Zywicki, The Problem With Using Bankruptcy as a Tool in the Campaign Finance 
Reform Crusade, American Bankruptcy Institute, at http://www.abiworld.org/Temp 
late.cfm?Section=Archives3&CONTENTID=7470&TEMPLATE=/ContentManagement/Co
ntentDisplay.cfm (May 22, 2000) (arguing that the media was treating the bill “as a pawn 
in its larger agenda of advancing the case for campaign finance reform”). 
166. One indication that the issues were never successfully linked is that Sen. John
McCain and Rep. Shays—two main sponsors of campaign finance reform bills—voted in 
favor of the bankruptcy bill. See Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1998, H.R. 3150, House Roll 
Call Vote #506, 105th Cong. (Oct. 9, 1998), http://clerk.house.gov/evs/1998/roll506.xml; 
Motion to Proceed to Consider Conference Report on H.R. 3150, H.R. 3150, Senate Roll 
Call Vote #313, 105th Cong. (Oct. 9, 1998), http://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll_ 
call_lists/roll_call_vote_cfm.cfm?congress=105&session=2&vote=00313. 
167. Nonetheless, this frame also affected bankruptcy reporting in the early 1980s.
See, e.g., Jacoby, supra note 78, at 229 n.47 (listing examples). 
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Lawmakers become defensive at the notion that they support 
bankruptcy legislation simply because of industry support and 
lobbying.168 The “controversy” value of this frame is thus arguably 
limited. 
2. Improvement? To the extent that allegations of special
interest fail to create substantial controversy, one should not 
expect this frame to coincide with or encourage specific changes 
to legislation. Although Senate Democrats sought to increase 
credit industry accountability throughout 1998 and may have 
found some encouragement to do so in the media, Congress 
watered down and deleted those very provisions even as the 
press continued to characterize the bill as a gift to the credit 
industry.169 Lawmakers did remove or modify some provisions 
that especially strengthened the collection rights of the credit 
industry,170 but these changes more likely were connected to 
framing bankruptcy in terms of women and children, discussed 
later.171 
3. Educational Value? An evaluation of media-
establishment influence is more complete if one also asks 
whether a particular frame advanced readers’ understanding of 
the substantive law and proposals to change it, which ultimately 
may affect the political viability of future legislative 
developments. The reporting implicitly told readers that the 
consumer credit industry has a lot at stake in the bankruptcy 
system.172 This is an important and relevant message, but the 
educational value may stop there. Campaign contribution 
168. One finds examples in the letters lawmakers wrote in response to articles and
editorials employing the industry influence frame. See, e.g., Sen. Joseph R. Biden Jr. (D-
Del.), Letter to the Editor, “Loopholes for Millionaires”, WASH. POST, July 19, 2001, at A26 
(clarifying his voting record and denying alleged support for the credit industry); Sen. 
Charles Grassley (R-Iowa) & Sen. Robert Torricelli (D-N.J.), Letter to the Editor, 
Bankruptcy Loopholes, WASH. POST, Feb. 15, 2000, at A22 (denouncing allegations that 
the bankruptcy reform bill favored creditors). 
169. The version of Senate Bill 1301 passed by the Senate in the 105th Congress
addressed credit industry accountability by further regulating credit-cards, dual use debit 
cards, and home equity loans and lines of credit. See S. 1301, 105th Cong. (1997); refer 
also to note 41 supra. The bill’s managers diluted or eliminated these provisions through 
managers’ amendments, conference reports, and reintroduced versions of the bill rather 
than discrete amendments. See, e.g., S. Amends. 3540–3617, 144 CONG. REC. S9942–
10,728, S10,843–44 (1998). 
170. Refer to note 237 infra and accompanying text.
171. Refer to Part III.C infra (attributing the weakening of provisions favoring the
credit industry to amendments packaged as helping women and children). 
172. Refer to notes 128–29 supra and accompanying text.
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statistics and K Street lobbying gossip teach readers little about 
the omnibus bankruptcy bill and how it might affect their lives.173 
Many versions of the omnibus bankruptcy bill had around 
280 provisions with multiple parts, and spanned well over 500 
pages.174 Its provisions would change the rules for the 
reorganization of large and small enterprises, municipalities, 
family farmers, family fisheries, and individuals in Chapter 11; 
add an entire new Chapter to the Bankruptcy Code to deal with 
transnational insolvency; regulate lawyers and their 
conversations with debtor clients; impose a variety of new 
obligations on the court system and the United States trustee 
system; and substantially complicate the consumer bankruptcy 
system for all filers.175 Stories framed in terms of the credit 
industry do not invite discussion of these important issues.176 
173. Cf. JAMIESON & WALDMAN, supra note 7, at 168 (noting that election coverage
focuses on the “horse race,” rather than the issues); SCHUDSON, supra note 80, at 52 
(noting the media’s preference for politics over policy and strategy and tactics over ideas); 
W. Lance Bennett, Cracking the News Code: Some Rules that Journalists Live By, in DO 
THE MEDIA GOVERN?, supra note 7, at 103, 105 (describing the “horse race plot” of
elections); Stuart W. Nolan, Jr., Campaign Finance Reform: Applying the First
Amendment in a Marketplace of Ideas, 6 J. COMM. L. & POL’Y 113, 113 (1998) (noting that
the media have traditionally “focused on the role of money in politics”); Joseph M.
Schwartz, Democracy Against the Free Market: The Enron Crisis and the Politics of Global
Deregulation, 35 CONN. L. REV. 1097, 1097 (2003) (stating that the “mainstream media
frames the Enron and subsequent corporate scandals as a story of political insider
trading: Bush’s Texas buddies using political connections to garner (de)regulatory breaks
and manipulate energy prices” and discounting this frame as only part of the story);
Shaviro, supra note 7, at 96–97 (describing how media coverage focuses on “horse races”
rather than ideas); Howard Kurtz, Reading Green Between the Lines, WASH. POST, Apr. 2,
2001, at C1 (highlighting the industry money reporting theme in bankruptcy and
elsewhere).
174. See, e.g., Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1999, H.R. 833, 106th Cong (1999).
175. See, e.g., Bankruptcy Reform Act of 2000, H.R. 833, 106th Cong., tits. III–V, VIII
(2000). 
176. The means test was the main substantive provision that reporters covered, and
even this was not reported in significant detail. See, e.g., Pae & Stoughton, supra note 125 
(“Among the proposals being debated in Congress is a ‘means test’ that is intended to 
move some filers from a Chapter 7 bankruptcy filing to a Chapter 11 filing, which 
requires a repayment plan.”). Three major newspapers published at least one story on the 
existence of business bankruptcy provisions, but did not delve into the changes that 
needed exposure and discussion. See Bankruptcy Media Database (on file with Author). 
Reporters sometimes focused on proposed amendments that were newsworthy but were 
not Bankruptcy Code amendments, such as minimum wage, limiting ATM fees, 
restricting Lloyds of London from suing U.S. investors in U.S. courts, application of the 
Fair Debt Collection Practices Act to bounced checks, and consumer credit regulation and 
disclosure. Id. The press also tended to discuss provisions addressing narrow but 
independently newsworthy categories of hypothetical or actual bankruptcy filers, such as 
gun manufacturers, recording artists and other celebrities, and, particularly, abortion 
protestors. Id.; see also John F. Witt, Narrating Bankruptcy/Narrating Risk, 98 NW. U. L. 
REV. 303, 311 (2003) (book review) (discussing how bankruptcy debates today occur “by 
proxy” with only remote relationship to bankruptcy itself). 
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This frame also leaves little room for more than 
oversimplified statements of current law. As just one important 
example, the media tended to draw an overly stark distinction 
between the two basic consumer bankruptcy options—Chapter 7 
and Chapter 13—in terms of debtor-friendliness and creditor 
treatment.177 Framing bankruptcy as an industry influence story 
was prevalent and not very surprising,178 but had questionable 
utility.  
B. Loopholes for the Rich
Reporters and commentators in the New York Times and the
Washington Post sometimes framed bankruptcy in terms of 
“loopholes for the rich,” suggesting that proponents of the bill 
preserved liberal bankruptcy policies for rich people but 
restricted relief for lower income filers.179 Although bill 
proponents similarly framed some discussions to justify support 
for the bill,180 their efforts seem less influential in shaping the 
177. See Melissa B. Jacoby, Collecting Debts from the Ill and Injured: The Rhetorical
Significance, but Practical Irrelevance, of Culpability and Ability to Pay, 51 AM. U. L. REV. 
229, 258–62 (2001) (explaining that arguments favoring legislation relied on inaccurate 
distinctions between types of bankruptcy). 
178. See Nourse & Schacter, supra note 30, at 587–88 (highlighting the Senate
staffers’ reporting of the ubiquitous role of lobbyists in the drafting process, with a cadre 
of lawyers at the ready); Stephen Nunez & Howard Rosenthal, Bankruptcy “Reform” in 
Congress: Creditors, Committees, Ideology, and Floor Voting in the Legislative Process, 20 
J.L. ECON. & ORG. 527, 528, 552–54 (2004) (finding that House voting on bankruptcy
“strongly reflect[ed] campaign contributions”), http://www.jleo.oupjournals.org/cgi/reprint/
20/2/527; cf. Thomas Stratmann, Can Special Interests Buy Congressional Votes? Evidence
from Financial Services Legislation, 45 J.L. & ECON. 345, 368 (2002) (“The results in this
paper support the hypothesis that interest groups ‘buy’ legislators’ votes with PAC
contributions. The findings show that contributions are most effective in swinging the
vote of more junior legislators.”).
179. For examples outside the bankruptcy context, see, e.g., David Cay Johnston,
I.R.S. More Likely to Audit the Poor and Not the Rich, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 16, 2000, § 1, at 1
(highlighting the shift in auditing rates to focus on the poor); David Cay Johnston,
Reducing Audits of the Wealthy, I.R.S. Turns Eye on Working Poor, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15,
1999, at A1 (same); see also David Cay Johnston, Gap Between Rich and Poor Found
Substantially Wider, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 5, 1999, at 16.
180. See Day, Foes of Bankruptcy Bill, supra note 130 (citing a creditor
representative as saying he was “dumbfounded that a group that purports to be concerned 
about low- and moderate-income people would be opposing legislation designed to force 
wealthy people who can afford to pay some of their debts to do so rather than sticking 
lower and moderate-income people with their tab”); Day, Senate Votes to Toughen 
Bankruptcy, supra note 124 (“Wealthier filers walk away from billions of dollars in debt 
each year, regardless of their ability to pay, . . . [which is] not fair to the 96 percent of 
Americans who pay their bills on time.” (quoting Edward Yingling of the American 
Bankers Assocation)); Stephen Labaton, House Votes to Make It Tougher to Escape Debt 
Through Personal Bankruptcy, N.Y. TIMES, May 6, 1999, at A28 (“‘The more we’re able to 
recoup some debt from high-income people, the less burden we will put on everyone 
else . . . .’” (quoting Rep. Gekas)); Seelye, Republicans Agree to New Limits, supra note 47 
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reporting, at least in this particular sample.181 Bill proponents’ 
reluctance to cap state homestead exemptions, “‘the single 
biggest scandal in the consumer bankruptcy system,’” became the 
principle vehicle for this frame.182 
A bit of background may be useful here. Property 
exemptions establish the types of property an individual debtor 
must forfeit or keep in Chapter 7 and help determine the 
minimum amount an individual debtor must repay to creditors in 
Chapters 13 or 11.183 Each state has its own set of property 
exemptions that applies in bankruptcy.184 States such as Florida, 
Texas, South Dakota, Iowa, and Kansas permit debtors to 
exempt very high value homesteads.185 Thus, it is technically 
possible that a bankruptcy filer could keep a multi-million dollar 
home and make little or no payment to creditors.186 The omnibus 
(“‘Consumers across the country who work hard and pay their own way should not be 
forced to subsidize the abusive spending practices of those who exploit the Federal 
bankruptcy code for personal gain or convenience . . . .’” (quoting Sen. Grassley)); Shenon, 
Bill Would Add Hurdles to Erasing of Debt, supra note 124 (quoting professor saying that 
there is “no good reason why a schoolteacher earning $30,000 a year should have to pay 
more for a mortgage or more for a new couch because some guy making $100,000 a year 
finds it inconvenient to pay his debts”); Shenon, Measure Gains on a Lopsided Senate 
Vote, supra note 137 (“‘This bill will do an awful lot of good for people in our society.’” 
(quoting Sen. Hatch)). Burt Reynolds was supposed to be the “poster child” for bankruptcy 
reform, see, e.g., 144 CONG. REC. E88 (1998) (statement of Rep. Gekas), not the poster 
child for killing bankruptcy reform. 
181. Cf. Witt, supra note 176, at 313.
[C]ritics of the [1800 Bankruptcy] Act began pointing out that the Act effectively
granted fresh starts to formerly wealthy merchants but not to the artisans and
farmers who were increasingly drawn into commercial relations but were
excluded from the Act’s coverage. Even worse, the fresh start for the merchant
might cancel debts owed to the farmer or artisan mechanic.
Id. 
182. David J. Morrow, Key to a Cozier Bankruptcy: Location, Location, Location, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 7, 1998, at A1 (quoting Elizabeth Warren) [hereinafter Morrow, Cozier 
Bankruptcy]; Floyd Norris, The New Bankruptcy Reform: Make the Rich Plan Ahead, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 2, 2000, at C1 (quoting opponent saying bill just tells wealthy debtors how to 
protect their assets). For a similar theme in an earlier piece, see Amy Stevens, Some 
Folks Hide Cash in the Darnedest Places, WALL ST. J., Nov. 8, 1996, at B1 (reporting on 
the generous exemptions in various states and the National Bankruptcy Reform 
Commission’s interest in capping them). 
183. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 552, 1129(a)(7), 1325(a)(4) (2000) (providing for exemptions for
individual debtors and requiring that creditors in repayment plans receive at least as 
much as they would have received from the liquidation of nonexempt assets). 
184. See CHARLES JORDAN TABB, THE LAW OF BANKRUPTCY 640–45 (1997). States are,
however, permitted to prevent their citizens from choosing the Federal Bankruptcy Code 
exemptions as an alternative. 11 U.S.C. § 522 (b)(1). 
185. See generally Lawrence Ponoroff, Exemption Limitations: A Tale of Two
Solutions, 71 AM. BANKR. L.J. 221 (1997) (reviewing diversity of state property 
exemptions). 
186. Bankruptcy law contains other policing mechanisms that can be used to curb
particularly egregious behavior along these lines, particularly if a debtor invested 
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bankruptcy bill did not itself create this situation; this is a 
problem of current (and longstanding) law.187 Yet the news 
reporting suggested that proponents of the bill were at fault for 
tolerating and preserving a loophole for the rich. 
A big front page New York Times article in early January 
1998 focused intensively on generous or unlimited homestead 
exemptions for wealthy bankruptcy filers.188 A journalist 
reporting on a General Accounting Office study of exemption 
usage noted that the “unlimited homestead exemption isn’t the 
populist shield it has often been cracked up to be, but rather a 
convenient protection for a few affluent people.”189 Articles 
attributed the failure to end what “is perhaps the most notorious 
abuse of the [bankruptcy] system in some states” to the omnibus 
bill and its supporters.190 The “high political symbolism” did not 
go unnoticed.191 News reports suggested that President Clinton 
supported capping exemptions to prevent differential rich-poor 
treatment.192 By contrast, the press reported that then Governor 
and later President George W. Bush, and legislators who 
nonexempt assets in an exempt home on the eve of bankruptcy. See, e.g., TABB, supra note 
184, at 651–55. 
187. See Posner, supra note 45, at 94–96 (discussing the conflict between federal and
state exemption laws); see also BRUCE H. MANN, REPUBLIC OF DEBTORS: BANKRUPTCY IN 
THE AGE OF AMERICAN INDEPENDENCE 197 (2002) (discussing concerns of Jeffersonians 
that federal bankruptcy law would override local real property exemptions). The bill did, 
however, include amendments that would permit a landlord to evict a bankruptcy filer 
without seeking permission from the bankruptcy court first, thus making bankruptcy 
harder on low-income renters than on those who owned expensive homes. See, e.g., 
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 2000, H.R. 833, 106th Cong. § 305(2)(B) (2000). 
188. Morrow, Cozier Bankruptcy, supra note 182.
189. Dan Morgan, GAO: “Homestead Exemption” Aids Well-Off Few: Bush, Texas
Officials on Record as Opposing Move to Limit Bankruptcy Shelter, WASH. POST, July 18, 
1999, at A6 [hereinafter Morgan, Homestead Exemption] (reporting on a General 
Accounting Office study that analyzed approximately 30,000 bankruptcy cases in Texas 
and Florida). 
190. Shenon, Bill Would Add Hurdles to Erasing of Debt, supra note 124 (pointing
out the bankruptcy loophole created by state homestead exemption laws). 
191. Morgan, Homestead Exemption, supra note 189; see also Day, Senate Votes to
Toughen Bankruptcy, supra note 124 (describing the difference between the House and 
Senate’s treatment of the homestead exemption and noting that the debate was sparked 
by bankruptcies of well-known people such as Burt Reynolds); Shenon, Bill to Tighten 
Bankruptcy Gets a Push, supra note 140 (noting the conflict between House and Senate 
versions of the bill). 
192. See, e.g., Labaton, Promised Veto, supra note 60 (citing a letter from White
House Chief of Staff John Podesta to House leaders warning that the proposed 
bankruptcy bill fails to eliminate homestead exemptions); Mayer, Negotiators Complete 
Bankruptcy Reform Bill, supra note 47 (noting that the White House was concerned over 
the bill’s lack of “fairness”); see also Schmidt, supra note 131 (noting that some Democrats 
were angry with Sen. Torricelli for supporting a bill that cracks down on the poor but not 
the rich). 
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otherwise supported restricting bankruptcy relief, opposed 
correction of this disparity.193 
Once the New York Times and the Washington Post editorial 
pages began their series of editorials on bankruptcy, they 
regularly framed discussions of bankruptcy in terms of 
preferential treatment and loopholes for the rich with a focus on 
property exemptions.194 In Bad Bankruptcy Legislation, the New 
York Times proclaimed it could not support the House Bill—a 
“parody of reform”—because the bill inflexibly “cracks down” on 
ordinary debtors but does “next to nothing” about the 
bankruptcies of Burt Reynolds and Bowie Kuhn.195 In Protecting 
Rich Bankrupts, the New York Times complained that the 
pending legislation 
would do nothing to limit the ways that the formerly 
wealthy have of stiffing creditors, of which the unlimited 
homestead exemption is only the best known. But the bill 
would be a boon to the credit card companies, which have 
pushed hard to get it enacted. . . . 
The bill deserves to be defeated, but if it is to be 
passed, it should at least be amended to keep Texas and 
Florida from providing such blatant protection to once 
wealthy deadbeats.196 
The New York Times distinguished the bill’s gentle 
treatment of the “well heeled” from its harsh treatment of 
“unsophisticated debtors.”197 While a potential Clinton veto was 
looming, the New York Times editorial desk lamented the bill’s 
193. See, e.g., Morgan, Homestead Exemption, supra note 189 (noting that President
Bush is solidly against changing the homestead exemption); Philip Shenon, Home 
Exemptions Snag Bankruptcy Bill, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 6, 2001, at A1 (stating that President 
Bush was a “passionate defender of the unlimited homestead exemption when he was 
governor of Texas”). 
194. Cf. Shaviro, supra note 7, at 11 & n.33 (noting the consistent concern about
“loopholes” in the income tax system from inception through the 1970s). Although Shaviro 
notes that the term “loopholes” is out of fashion in tax policy because it connotes an 
unintended rather than intended benefit, the term seemingly remains vibrant in 
bankruptcy policy discussions. Id. at 11 n.33. 
195. Editorial, Bad Bankruptcy Legislation, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 10, 1998, at A14 (“A
fair bill would attack the real abuses, while giving judges flexibility to consider the 
circumstances of debtors. This bill does neither. If it reaches his desk, President Clinton 
should veto it.”). 
196. Editorial, Protecting Rich Bankrupts, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 13, 1999, at A20 (noting
that the Texas Legislature had been seeking to expand the acreage of the homestead 
exemption). 
197. Editorial, A Gift for the Credit Card Industry, N.Y. TIMES, May 30, 2000, at A22
(highlighting that the bill allows wealth debtors to lock away millions in trust, while 
making those on modest incomes combine paying off credit-cards with paying for child 
care). 
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protection of those with “mansions, trust funds and pension 
accounts.”198 
Likewise, the Washington Post expressed concern about the 
bill’s failure to cap homestead exemptions199 and called this an 
“egregious loophole”: “Ordinarily, a proposal to tighten the 
screws on average families while allowing millionaires a loophole 
would attract some robust criticism. But the White House and 
congressional Democrats are oddly quiet.”200 The “egregious 
homestead exemption,” the Washington Post explained, “allows 
millionaires to keep the full value of a house they have owned for 
two years out of reach of creditors . . . . With a bit of planning, 
therefore, movie stars can still escape their creditors.”201 The 
Washington Post applauded President Clinton’s pocket veto “for 
the good reason that it was too tough on ordinary debtors . . . and 
too generous to high-rollers with fancy tax accountants,”202 and it 
scolded Sen. Biden for supporting the bill “despite its inclusion of 
a loophole allowing millionaires to shield mansions from their 
creditors.”203 Signed opinion pieces expressed similar concerns 
about unequal restrictions.204 
The reporting only occasionally applied the “loopholes for the 
rich” frame to other issues, which were far from central to the 
bankruptcy bill. For example, the bill briefly contained a 
controversial provision shielding investors from suit by Lloyds of 
198. Editorial, An Unfair Bankruptcy Bill, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13, 2000, at A34.
199. Editorial, Bad Ideas on Bankruptcy, WASH. POST, Feb. 18, 2000, at A22.
200. Editorial, The Rich Win, WASH. POST, June 9, 2000, at A32.
201. Bankrupt Bipartisanship, supra note 158.
202. Editorial, Reform Choice for Mr. Bush, WASH. POST, Feb. 19, 2001, at A32.
203. Loophole for Millionaires, supra note 158 (commending Sen. Leahy for wanting
to restrict homestead exemptions and require more credit-card disclosures, even though 
the outcome would depend on Sen. Biden’s support). 
204. See, e.g., David S. Broder, Business in the Driver’s Seat, WASH. POST, Mar. 14,
2001, at A25 (stating that legislation would “squeeze money” from those “clobbered by job 
losses, divorce or medical disasters, yet allow some millionaires to plead bankruptcy while 
turning their assets into mansions in states with unlimited homestead exemptions”); 
Norris, Bankruptcy Reform that Spares the Wealthy, supra note 160 (noting that the 
House Bill would not change entitlements of Burt Reynolds and Bowie Kuhn to keep 
expensive homes, but would “make life harder for poor and middle-class people,” and that 
taxpayers “will foot the bill to force people to pay their debts” unless those people are rich 
enough to shield their assets in valuable Texas or Florida homes); Floyd Norris, In 
Florida, Fraud Doesn’t Matter. Will Congress Object?, N.Y. TIMES, July 6, 2001, at C1 (“So 
Congress will crack down on struggling families that do not plan bankruptcies well. The 
question is whether it will close the loophole that allows some people to live in luxury 
while stiffing their creditors.”). Even Fred Hiatt, who was guarded in his support of either 
“side” of the bankruptcy debate, found after interviewing bankruptcy experts that it was 
“worth noting that the House refused to close the biggest loophole for the wealthy—a 
provision in some state laws that allows those entering bankruptcy to shield their assets 
in million-dollar mansions.” Fred Hiatt, Credit Due vs. Undue Credit, WASH. POST, June 
14, 1998, at C7. 
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London, which a front page story in the Washington Post 
characterized as an additional protection for millionaires.205 
1. Controversy? Exemptions have long been controversial,
as suggested earlier,206 and were again here. The news media did 
not itself create the controversy, but arguably reinforced it and 
kept pressure on lawmakers to seek a federal limit on state 
homestead exemptions—inevitably to be strenuously opposed by 
colleagues fighting for states’ rights—when proponents of 
limiting exceptions otherwise might have quietly retreated. 
Lawmakers dedicated multiple rounds of amendments to the 
homestead exemption in several congresses: One lawmaker 
would try to insert a homestead exemption limitation while 
another would try to remove the limitation or add an opt-out 
provision to address state rights and state constitutional 
concerns.207 At least one lawmaker would have tried to kill the 
bill on the basis of a homestead exemption cap, and others 
wholeheartedly opposed a cap.208 President Clinton allegedly 
205. Kathleen Day, Bankruptcy Bill Benefits Chosen Few: Well-to-Do Investors
Sought Special Provision, WASH. POST, Mar. 10, 2001, at A1. 
206. Refer to note 187 supra and accompanying text (discussing the property
exemption controversy). Some members of Congress presumably were interested in this 
issue before the media so actively framed the omnibus bankruptcy bill in these terms. For 
example, in the mid-1990s, Sen. Herb Kohl proposed freestanding legislation to cap state 
homestead exemptions for bankruptcy purposes. See Bankruptcy Abuse Reform Act of 
1995, S. 769, 104th Cong. § 2 (1995). As noted in the text, however, the media may have 
had a role in encouraging these lawmakers to continue the fight on this issue. 
207. For examples of amendments, see S. Amend. 68 to S.420, 107th Cong. (2001)
(limiting the value of property debtors may exempt under state or local law); S. Amend. 
2778 to S.625, 106th Cong. (1999) (same); H. Amend. 54 to H.R. 833, 106th Cong. (1999) 
(allowing states to opt out of the homestead exemption); S. Amend. 2516 to S. 625, 106th 
Cong. (1999) (limiting the value of property debtors may exempt under state or local law); 
S. Amend. 3599 to S. 1301, 105th Cong. (1998) (expressing the Senate’s sense of misuse
regarding the homestead exemption); H. Amend. 666 to H.R. 3150, 105th Cong. (1998)
(striking the $100,000 homestead exemption cap); H. Amend. 665 to H.R. 3150, 105th
Cong. (1998) (proposing to reorder the priority of governments when funds are disbursed);
H. Amend. 660 to H.R. 3150, 105th Cong. (1998) (limiting the amount of a debtor’s
homestead).
208. See, e.g., 145 CONG. REC. S14,481 (1999) (statement of Sen. Hutchison arguing
that states should be able to opt out of any exemption cap); Tom Hamburger, Senate 
Approves Bankruptcy Legislation Provision Capping Exemption on Home Equity May 
Lead to Battle with Bush, House, WALL ST. J., Mar. 16, 2001, at A3 (quoting Sen. Kay 
Bailey Hutchison as vowing to “‘do everything I can to fix this in conference . . . or 
unfortunately I am going to have to try and kill the bill’” (alteration in original)); Press 
Release, Bankruptcy Bill Violates States’ Rights, at http://brownback.senate.gov/pressapp/ 
record.cfm?id=175597& (Mar. 23, 2001) (reporting Sen. Brownback’s opposition to a bill 
containing a homestead exemption cap); Press Release, Senator Hutchison Vows 
Continued Effort to Preserve Texas’ Homestead Exemption: Will Work with Conference 
on Final Bankruptcy Legislation, at http://hutchison.senate.gov/prl201.htm (Feb. 2, 2000) 
(“It is wrong to pre-empt 130 years of American history—and the rights of every state—to 
go after a handful of bad actors. This is the classic government attempt to impose a one-
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based his pocket veto, in part, on the lack of a cap.209 This issue 
was significant enough to be described by political scientists as 
having “killer properties.”210 Because lawmakers developed a 
compromise, however, the controversy of the frame was not as 
enduring as some opponents to the bill may have hoped. 
2. Improvement of Legislation? As just noted, lawmakers
compromised in a manner that is not necessarily helpful.211 Had 
the media and experts used this frame to discuss other aspects of 
the omnibus bill,212 improvements might have been possible. 
Absent a focus on these other issues, however, the homestead 
exemption compromise limited the improvement possibilities. 
3. Educational Value? The “loopholes for the rich” frame as
applied to the homestead exemption may have taught readers the 
accurate lesson that state law fundamentally controls some of the 
perceived benefits of bankruptcy unless bankruptcy overrides 
that state law. On the other hand, the “loopholes for the rich” 
story principally relied on highlighting famous people with ample 
assets to satisfy creditors’ claims.213 Researchers have unearthed 
size-fits-all solution.”). 
209. See Memorandum of Disapproval for Bankruptcy Reform Legislation, 3 PUB. 
PAPERS 2730, 2730–31 (Dec. 19, 2000) (opposing the bill because of the “glaring omission 
of a real homestead cap”). 
210. See, e.g., Nunez & Rosenthal, supra note 178, at 1–2 (finding that in the Senate,
“state interests in homestead exemptions influenced voting” and that the homestead issue 
“had killer properties”). 
211. H.R. 975, 108th Cong. §§ 307, 308, 322 (2003) (imposing a new fraudulent
conveyance scheme, limiting exemptions claimed on property acquired within 1215 days 
of filing, and increasing domicile requirements for claiming state exemptions); see also 
147 CONG. REC. S2334–35 (2001) (letter from ninety-one law professors) (criticizing 
earlier compromise proposals that fell short of a firm cap on exemptions). 
212. Two examples from the means test are illustrative. First, the means test
partially relies on IRS guidelines to determine expenses of bankrupt households, but the 
IRS guidelines let richer families spend more money. See, e.g., H.R. 975 § 102. Thus, the 
default expense rules in the means test would let a high-income household of one spend 
more on food than a low-income family of four. See I.R.S. Publication 1854 (Rev. 8-2004) 
(setting the national standards for calculating food, clothing, and miscellaneous other 
expenses for the purpose of completing I.R.S. Form 433-A), available at http://www. 
irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p1854.pdf (providing a $976 monthly food, clothing, and miscellaneous 
allowance for an individual with a monthly income of $5834 or more, but providing $859 
monthly food, clothing, and miscellaneous allowance for a family of four with a monthly 
income of less than $833). In addition, the means test does not apply to debtors unless 
they have primarily consumer debts, and thus high-income individuals with large 
business-related debts who file Chapter 7 would not be means tested. See, e.g., Douglas 
Baird, Editorial, Bankruptcy Bill Would Prevent Some from Making a Fresh Start, CHI. 
TRIB., June 25, 1999, § 1, at 21 (explaining different outcomes for a high-income 
businessperson and a lower income widow with medical debts). 
213. See, e.g., Bad Bankruptcy Legislation, supra note 195 (criticizing bankruptcy
legislation for allowing wealthy filers such as Burt Reynolds to remain millionaires after 
filing for personal bankruptcy). 
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very few rich and famous bankruptcy filers.214 A disproportionate 
focus on this group could breed further distrust about the 
bankruptcy system and its users, the vast majority of whom, by 
most empirical accounts, are of quite modest means.  
Notwithstanding concerns about overemphasizing wealthy 
filers, readers might have been educated by a discussion of 
provisions included in the omnibus bankruptcy bill that preferred 
well-off, or at least well advised, bankruptcy filers.215 Those 
examples did not receive coverage, either because sources 
refrained from discussing them with reporters, or because 
reporters focused on more easily digestible issues. Many 
reporters do not believe that their job description includes 
thoroughly analyzing complex legal problems.216 Bankruptcy is 
not its own newsbeat.217 Journalists’ capacity for copious details is 
214. For example, the GAO studied exemption usage in districts in Florida and
Texas. The GAO found average homestead exemption claims of about $15,000 and median 
claims of $9000 in these districts for homestead exemptions of less than $100,000. The 
average and median exemption claims among those exceeding $100,000 (only one percent 
of the sample) hovered around $148,000 in Texas and $120,000 in Florida. GEN. 
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PUB. NO. GAO/GGD-99-118R, BANKRUPTCY REFORM: USE OF THE 
HOMESTEAD EXEMPTION BY CHAPTER 7 BANKRUPTCY DEBTORS IN THE NORTHERN DISTRICT 
OF TEXAS AND THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA IN 1998, at 1–3 (1999), http://www.gao 
.gov/archive/1999/gg99118r.pdf; TODD J. ZYWICKI, WHY SO MANY BANKRUPTCIES AND 
WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT: AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY LAW AND 
BANKRUPTCY REFORM 102 (George Mason Univ. Sch. of Law, Law & Econ. Working Paper 
Series No. 03-46, 2003) (finding that a cap on “homestead exemptions would have little 
effect on the bankruptcy filing rate”), http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=454121. For a list of 
“people with valuable personas who have filed for bankruptcy,” see Melissa B. Jacoby & 
Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Foreclosing on Fame: Exploring the Uncharted Boundaries 
of the Right of Publicity, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1322, 1325–26 (2002). 
215. Refer to note 212 supra (describing a scenario in which a high-income individual
would receive a larger personal expense allowance than low-income family of four). 
216. For example, according to one study in the early 1990s, a significant majority of
journalists attributed extreme importance to providing quick information, while less than 
half thought “providing analysis of complex problems” was extremely important. David H. 
Weaver & G. Cleveland Wilhoit, The American Journalist in the 1990s, in DO THE MEDIA 
GOVERN?, supra note 7, at 18, 25. See generally Trudy Lieberman, The Media and 
Government Regulation, 11 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 547, 550, 552–53 (2002) (noting that 
journalists shy away from detailed regulation as “too much inside baseball” and report 
underinclusively on legislation: “The law does not do a lot of things the press said it 
would, and it does others that the press entirely missed”); Walsh, supra note 83, at 9 
(conceding that reporters’ “need for brevity will inevitably lead to articles that 
oversimplify”). 
217. See WILLIS, supra note 10, at 103, 140 (advocating greater business
specialization, technical knowledge and experience, and engagement in research and 
describing some newsbeats as “career stoppers”); W. Lance Bennett, Cracking the News 
Code: Some Rules that Journalists Live By, in DO THE MEDIA GOVERN?, supra note 7, at 
103, 105 (stating that journalists decide which issues to cover based on the degree of 
public pronouncement and opposition to the issues); Lieberman, supra note 216, at 548 
(expressing that “reporters now avoid dull and complicated beats and stories” such as 
government) see also Goldstein, supra note 83, at 899 (quoting the Wall Street Journal 
managing editor as saying, “Law is ‘core, core, core’ to business,” but recognizing that the 
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likely sated by the breadth of subjects they cover.218 Short 
deadlines also may limit their tolerance for complexity.219 As a 
consequence, the educational potential of the “loopholes for the 
rich” frame likely was diminished. 
C. Women and Children
Far removed from the once-dominant theme of debtor
irresponsibility and a permissive bankruptcy system, media 
reporting sometimes framed the omnibus bankruptcy issue as a 
story of women and children.220 This frame developed with a high-
profile op-ed in The New York Times by Professor Elizabeth 
Warren.221 The women and children frame has two underlying 
substantive components that should be noted here. First, women 
collecting child support compete with institutional lenders, not 
only in but after bankruptcy, and the omnibus bankruptcy bill 
New York Times discarded its special law section and that weekly news magazines do not 
cover law very much). 
218. For example, Katharine Q. Seelye of the New York Times wrote twelve pieces on
bankruptcy—the most in the sample—during the period studied, but she also wrote on a 
wide range of subjects including presidential campaigns, impeachment, terrorism, gun 
control, environmental protection, and campaign finance. See e.g., Richard L. Berke & 
Katharine Q. Seelye, Now, Democrats Take Turn at Abortion Fight, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 
2000, at 1; Katharine Q. Seelye, A Tough Fight Ahead as Republicans Work to Keep 
Control of the House, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8, 1999, at A20; Katharine Q. Seelye, Bradley 
Proposes Revamping Federal Campaign Finance System, N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 1999, at 
A19; Katharine Q. Seelye, Clinton Asks Hunters to Back His Proposals Curbing Guns, 
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 28, 1999, at A26; Katharine Q. Seelye, Clinton Tearfully Receives 10 
Bodies, Praising Lives That “Nothing Can Erase”, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 14, 1998, at A10; 
Katharine Q. Seelye, Gay Voters Finding G.O.P. Newly Receptive to Support, N.Y. TIMES, 
Aug. 11, 1999, at A1; Katharine Q. Seelye, G.O.P.’s Hopes Dim for Filibuster-Proof Senate 
Margin, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30, 1998, at A31; Katharine Q. Seelye, Hillary Clinton Appeals 
for Gun Control Lobbying, N.Y. TIMES, May 9, 1999, at 25; Katharine Q. Seelye, Italian 
Presses Clinton on Pilot’s Acquittal, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6, 1999, at A1; Katharine Q. Seelye, 
Killings in Littleton Pierced Soul of the Nation, N.Y. TIMES, May 21, 1999, at A23; 
Katharine Q. Seelye, Leading Environmentalists Put Support and Money Behind Gore, 
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 1999, at A24; Katharine Q. Seelye, Livingston Wants Early Close to It 
All, If It Could Be Done”, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 20, 1998, at A28; Katharine Q. Seelye, Low on 
Cash, Dole Withdraws from G.O.P. Race, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 21, 1999, at A1; Katharine Q. 
Seelye, Report Suggests Jordan Suspected Affair, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12, 1998, at A15; 
Katharine Q. Seelye, Stumping as a Knowing Ally of Farmers, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 22, 2000, 
at A11; Katharine Q. Seelye, The Candidate Tied to the Decision, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 31, 
1999, at A12. Later, Seelye even wrote about cities and fat burning. See Katharine Q. 
Seelye, Cities Made for Walking May Be Fat Burners, N.Y. TIMES, June 20, 2003, at A16. 
219. SCHUDSON, supra note 80, at 34 (stating that subjectivity in journalism results
from strict deadlines). 
220. Cf. GÓMEZ, supra note 89, at 121 (discussing the transformation of the crack
baby problem from a narrow concern into a broader women’s problem). 
221. Elizabeth Warren, Editorial, Bankrupt? Pay Your Child Support First, N.Y. 
TIMES, Apr. 27, 1998, at A15 (describing how proposed legislation could give credit-card 
debt the same priority as child support payments). 
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strengthens the rights of those institutional lenders.222 Second, 
although less prominent in the news reporting, single-filing 
women are the fastest growing group of bankruptcy filers.223 The 
hundreds of changes buried within the omnibus bankruptcy bill 
would have a large and likely negative effect on these women and 
their families. 
A variety of stories mentioned the possibility that the 
omnibus bankruptcy bill would adversely affect women and 
children.224 The reporting attracted First Lady Hillary Rodham 
Clinton’s attention, which in turn became a news media focus.225 
Women’s group representatives, by offering quotes in bankruptcy 
222. See id.
223. See ELIZABETH WARREN & AMELIA WARREN TYAGI, THE TWO-INCOME TRAP: WHY 
MIDDLE-CLASS MOTHERS AND FATHERS ARE GOING BROKE 97–122 (2003) (explaining that 
the filing rate among single mothers has increased dramatically, but conceding that the 
filing rate among divorced fathers is almost as alarming and that “filing for bankruptcy 
may be the most responsible thing these divorced fathers can do for their children”); 
Melissa B. Jacoby et al., Rethinking the Debates over Health Care Financing: Evidence 
from the Bankruptcy Courts, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 375, 391 (2001) (describing the rapid 
growth of the percentage of women filing singly and the implications for medical-related 
bankruptcy); Oliver B. Pollak, Gender and Bankruptcy: An Empirical Analysis of Evolving 
Trends in Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 Bankruptcy Filings 1996–1997, 102 COM. L.J. 333, 
335 tbl.2, 336 (1997) (showing that the percentage of bankruptcy filings attributable to 
women has increased since 1967); see also Karen Gross et al., Ladies in Red: Learning 
from America’s First Female Bankrupts, 40 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 1, 14, 20 (1996) (stating 
that the earliest female bankruptcy filers in the 1800s were predominantly single 
women); Elizabeth Warren, What Is a Women’s Issue? Bankruptcy, Commercial Law, and 
Other Gender-Neutral Topics, 25 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 19, 28 (2002) [hereinafter Warren, 
What Is a Women’s Issue?] (finding that the number of women filing for bankruptcy 
without a spouse has increased 800% since the early 1980s). 
224. See, e.g., Day, Bankruptcy Legislation Still Faces Hurdles, supra note 144
(reporting on bill proponents’ defense of bill, claiming “backing from child-support 
collection agencies around the country”); Stephen Labaton, Rights Groups Shift Battle to 
New Front: Economic Issues, N.Y. TIMES, May 10, 1999, at A18 (“[T]he House of 
Representatives passed a bill by a veto-proof margin that would make it much harder for 
American families, particularly women and the elderly, to have their debts erased through 
bankruptcy proceedings.” (emphasis added)); Morgan, Creditors’ Money, supra note 37 
(discussing the effects of reform on women among list of reform opponents’ concerns); Pae, 
supra note 130 (“[Children] would be reduced to no more than a piece of jewelry.” (quoting 
Rep. Louise Slaughter (D-N.Y.))); Seelye, Vote on Measure to Tighten Bankruptcy, supra 
note 125 (reporting that critics of the bill state that it would place credit-card companies 
on the same plane as single parents recovering alimony or child support payments). 
225. See HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON, LIVING HISTORY 384–85 (2003) (discussing
involvement with women and children’s issue in the bankruptcy bill); WARREN & TYAGI, 
supra note 223, at 123–26 (reporting that First Lady Clinton’s interest in talking to 
Professor Warren and learning about bankruptcy stemmed from the New York Times op-
ed); Hillary Rodham Clinton, Bankruptcy Shouldn’t Let Parents off the Hook, WASH. 
TIMES, May 7, 1998, at A2 (stating that the “administration has worked too long and too 
hard to improve child support collection to see it now threatened [by the bankruptcy 
bill]”); see also Pae & Stoughton, supra note 125 (discussing Hillary Clinton’s concerns for 
single parents); Seelye, First Lady in a Messy Fight, supra note 4 (reporting on the 
private meeting between Hillary Clinton and Professor Warren about women’s issues). 
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stories and writing letters to the editor, helped cement 
bankruptcy’s relevance to their constituencies.226 One article 
quoted Rep. Jerrold Nadler (D-N.Y.), a progressive Democrat 
well-versed in bankruptcy, characterizing the bill as “‘Mom 
versus Chemical Bank.’”227 Other media outlets outside the 
Article’s sample, such as USA Today, also used this frame.228 
News reports and editorials also framed bankruptcy 
discussions in terms of the FACE abortion-protestor amendment, 
which in turn heightened the gendered implications of 
bankruptcy reform.229 This issue was particularly newsworthy 
when Vice President Al Gore rushed from the presidential 
campaign trail in case he was needed to cast the tie-breaking 
vote in the Senate on this amendment.230 
226. See, e.g., Joan Entmacher, Letter to the Editor, Children, Bankruptcy, Creditors, 
WASH. POST, June 22, 1999, at A16 (explaining that the bill gives greater priority to 
commercial lenders after bankruptcy); Seelye, First Lady in a Messy Fight, supra note 4 
(“‘There is a big stake in this for women and children,’ said Joan Entmacher, vice 
president of the National Women’s Law Center in Washington. ‘It was a really critical role 
that Mrs. Clinton played in having the White House insist that the final bill had to 
protect those populations.’”). 
227. Seelye, Vote on Measure to Tighten Bankruptcy, supra note 125.
228. See, e.g., Deeper in Debt, ECONOMIST, July 3, 1999, at 64, 64 (calling First Lady
Hillary Clinton the most vocal opponent of the bill and suggesting that she might 
therefore be able to stop it); Christine Dugas, Critics Say Bankruptcy Bills Threaten Child 
Support, USA TODAY, Apr. 30, 1998, at 1A (citing sources complaining that “‘the credit 
industry will be taking money out of the pockets of women and children’”); Christine 
Dugas, Women Rank 1st in Bankruptcy Filings, USA TODAY, June 21, 1999, at 1A 
(quoting sources explaining that bankruptcy is a women’s issue and that bankruptcy 
reform would have a particularly hard effect on women); Associated Press, Study Shows 
Women Resorting to Bankruptcy More than Men, CHI. TRIB., June 22, 1999, at 4 
(comparing different viewpoints on whether or not the legislation will hurt women); 
Elizabeth Warren, The New Women’s Issue: Bankruptcy Law, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, 
Sept. 10, 1999, at 11, 11 (discussing how proposed legislation would negatively impact 
“financially troubled families,” a group increasingly headed by women). 
229. Dewar & Day, supra note 136 (quoting Sen. Patty Murray saying that the issue
is not about theater, but “‘about the very real issue of violence against women’”); Lois 
Romano & Helen Dewar, Gore Rushes to Hill Abortion Vote, WASH. POST, Feb. 3, 2000, at 
A14 (quoting Sen. Grassley, who characterized Gore’s trip back to Washington as 
“‘theater’”). Refer to note 235–36 infra and accompanying text (providing examples of 
reactions to tying the abortion issue to the bankruptcy bill). For reporting on President 
Clinton’s position on the abortion provision, see Editorial, Bankruptcy Law and Violence, 
N.Y. TIMES, June 9, 2000, at A30 (referring to the use of bankruptcy to discharge FACE 
debts and expressing concern about this “increasingly popular loophole”); Day, House 
Passes Tougher Debt Rules, supra note 126 (mentioning FACE Amendment as one of 
President Clinton’s major concerns). 
230. Katharine Q. Seelye, Gore Abortion Scramble, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3, 2000, at A20
(describing how Gore’s frantic return to Washington on a commercial airline was 
unnecessary because the Republicans decided at the last minute to support the 
amendment).  
2004] NEGOTIATING BANKRUPTCY LEGISLATION 1139 
1. Controversy? Although the use of this frame seems less
extensive in this sample, most who were involved with or 
followed the bankruptcy bill’s development would likely agree 
that this media frame sparked controversy.231 First Lady Hillary 
Rodham Clinton’s interest, initially fueled by this framing, 
contributed to the development of the Clinton Administration’s 
position, including the pocket veto.232 More than thirty women’s 
groups came out in opposition to a bill regarding an issue that 
previously was not even on their radar screens and took their 
concerns to the public, legislators, and the White House through 
written commentary, meetings, testimony, and other avenues.233 
The legislative process slowed as lawmakers and staff had little 
choice but to “solve” the women-and-children problem.234 
231. This approach also continued beyond the time period studied in this Article. See, 
e.g., Elizabeth Warren, Editorial, A Quiet Attack on Women, N.Y. TIMES, May 20, 2002, at
A19 (describing the effects of the proposed bankruptcy legislation on women as
“devastating”).
232. See, e.g., Letter from Jacob J. Lew, Acting Director, Office of Management and
Budget, Executive Office of the President, to Hon. George W. Gekas (May 21, 1998) 
(complaining that the bill puts credit-cards in competition with support obligations after 
bankruptcy); Letter from Jacob J. Lew, Director, Office of Management and Budget, 
Executive Office of the President, to Hon. Trent Lott (Oct. 9, 1998) (listing among reasons 
for opposing bill, the bill’s increase of competition between credit-card lenders and 
support recipients); Press Release, Office of the Press Secretary, The White House, 
President Clinton Hails Child Support Progress and Signs into Law Tough New Penalties 
for Deadbeat Parents (June 24, 1998) (“[T]he President will reiterate his position that 
bankruptcy reform legislation should not make it harder to collect child support and 
alimony.”); Radio Address of the President to the Nation (Office of the Press Secretary, 
The White House, radio broadcast, May 9, 1998) (criticizing bankruptcy bill, in honor of 
Mother’s Day, for forcing mothers “to compete with powerful banks and credit card 
companies”); Statement of Administration Policy on H.R. 3150, supra note 42 (basing 
opposition to house bill in part on the fact that increased credit-card nondischargeability 
would adversely affect domestic support recipients). 
233. See, e.g., Letter from Patricia Ireland, President, NOW, to Hon. John Conyers
Jr. and Hon. Jerrold Nadler (May 15, 1998) (on file with the Houston Law Review) 
(opposing legislation); Letter from the National Partnership for Women and Families, to 
U.S. Representatives (June 9, 1998) (expressing “deep concerns” about House Bill 3150 
because of its effects on women as debtors and as creditors); Letter from National 
Women’s Law Center and National Partnership for Women and Families, to U.S. Senate 
(Sept. 17, 1999) (regarding Senate Bill 625 and its potential impact on women who file for 
bankruptcy); Letter from National Women’s Law Center and National Partnership for 
Women and Families, to U.S. Senators (June 24, 1999); Press Release, NOW Action Alert, 
Changes in Bankruptcy Law Bad News for Women, at http://www.now.org/issues/ 
economic/alerts/04-24-98.html (Apr. 24, 1998) (urging women’s advocates to oppose Senate 
Bill 1301); Press Release, NOW, NOW Warns Senate and Credit Card Companies: 
“Bankruptcy Legislation Will Harm Women, Children, Retirees” (May 2, 2000) 
(commenting on both the child support and the abortion issues). 
234. See Letter from 31 Senators, U.S. Senate, to Hon. Orrin Hatch, Chairman, and
Hon. Patrick Leahy, Ranking Member, Senate Judiciary Committee (May 5, 1998) (on file 
with the Houston Law Review) (“We are particularly concerned with the impact of the 
proposed legislation on children and single parents and urge you to eliminate provisions 
that harm these vulnerable families.”). 
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The media also may have helped attract additional attention 
to the FACE amendment, which of course was inherently 
controversial. This issue has not only delayed the bill’s passage,235 
but also prompted organizations such as the United States 
Conference of Catholic Bishops to take a position on bankruptcy 
legislation.236 
2. Improvement? This frame affected the contents of the
bill. After initially denying any adverse effects, bill proponents 
quickly shifted course and added provisions directed toward child 
support collection in bankruptcy.237 Governmental collection 
agencies and select others lauded the amendments,238 leading bill 
proponents to describe the bill as helpful to women and 
235. See, e.g., Nunez & Rosenthal, supra note 178 (describing the abortion
amendment as an issue that can be used strategically to sink legislation); Letter from 
Gene Sperling, National Economic Advisor, to Hon. Trent Lott (Sept. 22, 2000) 
(explaining that President Clinton “will not sign any legislation that does not contain an 
effective means to ensure accountability and responsibility of perpetrators of clinic 
violence”). Refer to Part II.C supra. For a politically charged entanglement of another 
women’s issue with the bankruptcy legislation, see 146 CONG. REC. 8097 (2000) 
(statement of Rep. Nadler) (reacting to proposal to tie Violence Against Women Act 
reauthorization to bankruptcy legislation, “I urge the other body to not use battered, 
abused, and murdered women, who do not have the millions to lobby Congress, to give a 
gift to the banks and creditors”). 
236. Office of Gov’t Liaison, U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops, Our Legislative
Concerns in the 108th Congress, at http://www.usccb.org/ogl/prolife.htm (Jan. 6, 2004) 
(stating that the conference “oppose[s] provisions that would deny bankruptcy protection 
to abortion protesters”). 
237. H.R. 975, 108th Cong. §§ 211–219 (2003) (proposing various amendments
relating to child support obligations). 
238. See, e.g., Letter from Joel Bankes, Executive Director, National Child Support
Enforcement Association, to U.S. Senators (Sept. 4, 1998) (on file with the Houston Law 
Review) (stating that the bill promotes support collection); Letter from Jonathan Burris, 
President, California Family Support Council, to Hon. George W. Gekas (June 4, 1998) 
(on file with the Houston Law Review) (positing that the bill “contains a veritable ‘wish 
list’” of improvements for support obligations); Letter from Heidi Heitcamp, Chair, 
National Association of Attorneys General Bankruptcy and Taxation Working Group, to 
Senator Orrin G. Hatch & Senator Patrick J. Leahy (July 30, 1998) (on file with the 
Houston Law Review) (applauding provisions that ensure child support collection, but 
expressing some concerns); Letter from Michael D. Hess, Corporation Counsel of the City 
of New York, to Hon. George W. Gekas (June 5, 1998) (on file with the Houston Law 
Review) (complementing bill’s improvement in treatment of support recipients); Letter 
from John R. Justice, President, National District Attorneys Association, to Hon. Trent 
Lott (Sept. 2, 1998) (on file with the Houston Law Review) (stating that the bill helps 
collect support). But see Letter from Richard Blumenthal, Attorney General, State of 
Connecticut, to Hon. Jerrold Nadler (July 24, 1998) (on file with the Houston Law Review) 
(supporting child support provisions but opposing anticonsumer legislation overall); 
Letter from Geraldine Jensen, Association for Children for Enforcement of Support, to 
Hon. George W. Gekas (Mar. 17, 1999) (on file with the Houston Law Review) (supporting 
parts of the bill but expressing other concerns about keeping bankruptcy accessible for 
spouses who need bankruptcy after not receiving support). 
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children239 and to denounce President Clinton’s pocket veto of the 
bill as “a blow to women and children everywhere.”240 Others 
would contend that these amendments were not responsive to the 
concerns raised in the press, and in some respects were rather 
superficial.241 
Aside from the support amendments, however, there is 
reason to believe this frame ultimately encouraged the omission 
or limitation of some provisions that were particularly beneficial 
to the credit industry. For example, early versions of the bill 
substantially expanded the nondischargeability of credit-card 
debt.242 After complaints that these provisions hampered the 
collection of child support and alimony, some of these 
nondischargeability provisions were watered down and even 
omitted in amendments designated as having implications for 
women and children.243  
3. Educational Value? Bill supporters claimed that this
frame was contrived and disingenuous.244 Notwithstanding their 
239. See, e.g., Rep. Bill McCollum, Bankruptcy Reform: A Return to Responsibility, 
HILL, May 20, 1998, at 38 (“Contrary to [news coverage], H.R. 3150 strengthens an ex-
spouse’s ability to recover child support and alimony . . . .”); News Release, Gekas 
Bankruptcy Bill Passes House: Measure Will Protect Consumers and Reduce Fraud (Mar. 
31, 2001) (stating that the “reform bill brings increased protection for women and children 
who are left destitute” when their ex-spouses file for bankruptcy). 
240. Press Release, Rep. George W. Gekas, Gekas Denounces Clinton Pocket Veto of
Bankruptcy Reform: Gekas Encouraged by Bush Administration (Dec. 21, 2000) (on file 
with the Houston Law Review). 
241. For a detailed discussion, see Warren, What Is a Women’s Issue?, supra note 
223, at 21, 39–42; Will Bankruptcy Reform Help Women and Children?, CONSUMER 
BANKR. NEWS, May 31, 2001, at 9, 9 (reporting that women’s groups see the bill as 
“window dressing on an empty house”); see also 147 CONG. REC. S2334–35 (2001) (Letter 
from 91 Law Professors) (criticizing the omnibus bankruptcy bill because alleged 
problems affecting women and children have not been fixed). 
242. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1998, H.R. 3150, 105th Cong. § 141 (as introduced on
Feb. 3, 1998); see also Memorandum from Robin Jeweler, American Law Division, 
Congressional Research Service, Impact of Consumer Bankruptcy Reform Proposals on 
Child Support Obligations 4 (May 13, 1998) (on file with the Houston Law Review) 
(discussing additional categories of nondischargeable debt in bankruptcy bill). Refer to 
note 232 supra (providing examples from the Clinton Administration that criticize the 
effects of the bankruptcy bill on child support recipients). 
243. See, e.g., Boxer Amendment, S. 108, 147 CONG. REC. S2415 (2001) (proposing
changes to Senate Bill 420). Along the same lines, the involvement of women’s groups 
probably helped limit the scope of a provision in the bill that substantially enhanced the 
treatment of secured creditors in Chapter 13 plans. Leahy Amendment, S. 105, 147 CONG. 
REC. S2348 (2001) (reducing the automotive debt “cramdown” period from five years to 
three, consistent with the requests of women’s groups). 
244. Letter from John R. Justice, President, National District Attorneys Association,
to Hon. Trent Lott (Sept. 2, 1998) (on file with the Houston Law Review) (calling critics of 
legislation either “disingenuous” or lacking knowledge of the child support collection 
process). Judge Jones asserts that the USA Today quotes of Professors Elizabeth Warren 
and Ken Klee were a 
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reaction, this frame arguably was the most educational of those 
described in this Article. 
General audience discussions tend to conceptualize 
bankruptcy and debtor-creditor law in terms of debtor versus 
creditor, downplaying or disregarding the competition between 
creditors. Yet in bankruptcy, many types of creditors have long 
competed with each other over hopelessly meager assets or 
future income.245 Enhancements to one creditor’s entitlements 
inevitably have distributional consequences, and the women and 
children frame brought this issue to the forefront. If we have not 
given up hope of a reasonably informed discourse about legal 
systems and proposals to change them, it is important that the 
public and lawmakers understand this dynamic in the debtor-
creditor system. 
This frame also had the potential to teach the public that 
women continue to face serious financial trouble even though 
they have made many major advances.246 The public benefits from 
blatant misrepresentation of the bills and current bankruptcy law. I think we all 
have a right to expect more expertise and candor from tenured professors at two 
of our nation’s outstanding law schools than are displayed in these statements. 
. . . . 
. . . Professors Klee and Warren are not attempting to be precise, only to 
be obstructionist. 
Letter from Hon. Edith H. Jones, to Hon. Orrin C. Hatch, Hon. Charles E. Grassley, Hon. 
Henry J. Hyde, and Hon. George W. Gekas 1, 3 (Apr. 30, 1998) (on file with the Houston 
Law Review); Bill McCollum, Letter to the Editor, Bankruptcy Reform, N.Y. TIMES, May 
3, 1998, at A16 (stating that Professor Warren’s claims were “false,” asserting that 
Professor Warren “opposes reforms that would return responsibility to bankruptcy,” and 
arguing that Professor Warren “offers no reason why she believes that middle-class 
families should bear the burden for irresponsible higher income borrowers”); “Dear 
Colleague” Letter from Reps. George W. Gekas, Rick Boucher, Bill McCollum, and James 
F. Moran (Apr. 2, 1998) (stating that the “attempt by opponents of bankruptcy reform to
create confusion in the minds of Congress and the American public by raising the
emotionally charged issue of unpaid child support is merely a smokescreen”); see also
David Frum, Bankruptcy Reform Is a Moral Issue, WALL ST. J., Feb. 11, 2000, at A14
(noting sarcastically that we should now expect to hear that women will be burdened by
this legislation); Hiatt, supra note 204 (noting that bill opponents had difficulty
countering bill’s rhetoric until they “came up with the widows-and-children argument
(updated for our era to divorcees-and-children)”); Letter from Rep. Bill McCollum et al., to
President William J. Clinton (May 11, 1998) (on file with the Houston Law Review)
(writing to “correct any misinformation” expressed in his radio address and to “assure
[him] that this is false”).
245. A Statement of the Interest of Creditors in a Bankruptcy Case: Hearing on H.R.
833 Before the House Subcomm. on Commercial and Admin. Law of the Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 106th Cong. (Mar. 16, 1999) (testimony of Leon S. Forman, esq.) 
(“Enhancement of the treatment of one type of creditor often comes at the cost of 
another.”); JAMES ANGELL MACLACHLAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF BANKRUPTCY 57, 381 
(1956) (explaining how creditors jockey for position and contest one another’s claims). 
246. See generally WARREN & TYAGI, supra note 223, at 97–122 (concluding that
“despite all the progress, middle-class single mothers are no more financially secure today 
than they were a generation ago”). 
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learning about the interplay between bankruptcy, financial 
distress, and other socioeconomic problems.247 Framing the 
bankruptcy debate in terms of women and children had the 
potential to advance that educational goal.  
To be sure, the media rarely presented these points in fine 
detail, but the frame attracted the attention of those with a 
special interest in these issues. Thus, once exposed to a general 
conception of the problem, readers could educate themselves 
further about how current bankruptcy law really works and how 
the legislation would change the system.248 
IV. CONCLUSION
This Article has explored the roles of the media in legislative 
development with a specific focus on the lingering omnibus 
bankruptcy bill. I cannot prove causation, but the analysis 
suggests that the news media interacted with the legislative 
process, and, in some instances, may have altered the course of 
deliberations. In light of the academic literature on the role of 
sources in news reporting,249 it is possible that some opposed to 
the legislation who were denied seats at the Congressional 
bargaining table found an indirect method of participation.250 If 
that is the case, the news media’s role in the legislative process 
may include giving a voice to otherwise-excluded parties. 
Because evaluating the consequences of news coverage is a 
more complex inquiry, however, this is not entirely an 
empowering story. Negotiating legislation through the news 
media is a time consuming enterprise, requiring immediate 
responsiveness to reporters who seek one’s input251 and reaching 
247. Jacoby et al., supra note 223, at 391 (describing the rapid growth of the
percentage of women filing singly and the implications for medical-related bankruptcy); 
Pollak, supra note 223, at 336 (discussing sociological issues and filing rates among 
women); see also Gross et al., supra note 223, at 20–21 (providing the demographic 
characteristics of America’s earliest female debtors). See generally Warren, What Is a 
Women’s Issue, supra note 223, at 28 (reporting on single filing women in bankruptcy). 
248. The Author’s files and e-mail archives include dozens of communications
involving women’s groups seeking to understand bankruptcy law and legislation and to 
communicate their concerns to others. See Nat’l Women’s Law Ctr., Bankruptcy Bill: 
Harsh on Economically Vulnerable Women and Families, Tolerant of Abuses by 
Perpetrators of Clinic Violence (Mar. 2003) (on file with the Houston Law Review) 
(presenting a detailed discussion of the bankruptcy bill and its effects on women). 
249. Refer to notes 111–17 supra and accompanying text.
250. Refer to notes 2–7 supra and accompanying text (describing the bankruptcy
establishment’s involvement with the reform bill). 
251. Walsh, supra note 83, at 14 (explaining the importance of returning media calls
extremely promptly). 
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out to reporters who do not.252 Due to journalistic conventions, 
experts who make the commitment and the connections still 
must refrain from comments and complaints heavy on substance 
and legal details if they wish to be heard.253 With respect to 
legislation as dense and incomprehensible as the omnibus 
bankruptcy bill, this means that legitimate concerns about the 
drafting and effects may never enter the public discourse at all. 
Complexity becomes a convenient cloak for policy decisions.  
Without a forum to explain complex issues, expert sources 
must either find more salient and thematic ways to expose these 
problems or, more likely, simply attempt to increase the 
controversy of legislation they find troubling. Yet even if a source 
actively and successfully participates in framing an issue in a 
controversial fashion, that source cannot control the 
consequences. For example, those who may have helped frame 
bankruptcy in terms of loopholes for the rich probably do not 
relish the fact that the reporting unduly emphasizes the rich and 
famous, nor do they likely approve of the compromises the 
lawmakers reached. Those who helped frame bankruptcy as an 
issue of women and children may have been surprised by the 
ultimate reaction—the addition to the bill of an entire section of 
domestic support collection amendments having little to do with 
the concerns raised in the press. 
These limits notwithstanding, researchers in other 
disciplines have long recognized and closely examined the 
relevance of the news media to law. Lawyers and law professors 
with interest in the legislative process or legislative-intense 
subjects have much to gain from joining in the study of this 
important relationship. 
252. See, e.g., WEISS & SINGER, supra note 111, at 26–28 (describing how reaching
out to the media via press releases can be effective); SIGAL, supra note 111, at 104–07 
(explaining how extensively reporter rely on press conferences and press releases as 
sources for news stories); see also Colbert, supra note 115, at 556–57 (discussing the 
success of a professor in gaining media attention for his capital trial error rate study). 
253. WEISS & SINGER, supra note 111, at 47 (describing the ideal news source as
cooperative, concise, and straightforward). 
